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Abstract
I examine, separately, the impact of three education programs on student achieve-
ment, using difference-in-differences and difference-in-difference-in-differences designs.
First, I examine whether spillover benefits on achievement exist from preschool. I
estimate the effect of exposure to a South Carolina preschool program that targets
disadvantaged four-year-olds on students’ test scores in grades 3 through 5, where
exposure means residing in a school district once the program was made available and
disadvantaged students are those eligible for free or reduced-price lunch or Medicaid.
I find that exposure to the preschool program not only increases the math and reading
scores of targeted students, but also has positive effects on the math and reading scores
of non-targeted students, those not able to participate in the program. Additional
analysis suggests that these spillover effects may stem, in whole or in part, from
improvements to classroom decorum via fewer behavioral disruptions. Second, my
coauthors and I analyze the effect of Community Eligibility Provision, a universal
free-lunch program, on middle and elementary school students’ academic performance
and attendance in the state of South Carolina. We show that this program leads to
about 0.06 of a standard deviation increase in math test scores for elementary school
students. We find smaller, but statistically insignificant effects on reading scores. We
find no significant effect on middle school students’ test scores. The effects are most
substantial for students that were previously eligible for free lunches, but not on other
public assistance programs. We also find a larger effect on math scores in rural areas
than in urban areas. Third, I examine whether financial aid impacts achievement
differently for low- and high-income students. I find that student aid increases the
iii
GPAs and graduation prospects of low-income students but has little impact on high-
income students. Additional analysis suggests that reduction in student part-time
work among low-income students may be a potential mechanism for the heterogeneous
achievement effects of grant aid by income. These results suggest that merit aid
programs could be targeted more effectively than most currently are. Together, the
studies demonstrate the effectiveness of education programs in influencing human
capital accumulation and reducing socioeconomic disparities.
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Chapter 1
The Spillover Benefits of Expanding Access to
Preschool1
1.1 Introduction
The early years of a child’s life are arguably the most important for the formation
of cognitive and non-cognitive skills in the short, medium, and long term. These skills
are critical contributors to a child’s overall success in life (Heckman 2006). In the
United States, many believe that investing in the early stages of a child’s life can
enhance that child’s readiness for school, resulting in academic improvements during
school (Wong 2015). This belief has motivated policymakers to invest in establishing
publicly-funded preschool programs, including 4K programs, which are preschool
programs serving four-year-old children.2 A number of studies have examined the
effect of preschool programs on cognitive skills. The findings from most of these
studies are consistent: preschool programs have demonstrated positive effects on
1Williams, Breyon. 2019. Economics of Education Review. 70c: 127-143. Reprinted here with
permission of publisher.
2 Many of these preschool programs target disadvantaged children based on studies that demon-
strate children from low-socioeconomic-status families may benefit more from early childhood
programs than their more affluent peers (Magnuson et al. 2004). In many instances, children from
low-socioeconomic-status families lag in cognitive skills (Reardon 2011). Thus, early childhood
programs can partially offset risk factors that have adverse effects on childhood development (Doyle
et al. 2009).
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academic achievement.3 This result is observed among studies based on Head Start4,
randomized experimental trials (Elango et al. 2015; Heckman et al. 2010; Heckman,
Pinto, and Savelyev 2013), and preschool programs (targeted and universal) at the
state level5.
Given the consensus around the private returns to preschool, I examine if spillover
benefits on academic performance exist from preschool. I define spillover effects
as those deriving from exposure to South Carolina’s targeted preschool program
(residing in a school district where the program was available at age four) that are
not driven by participation in the program. Targeted students are those eligible for
free or reduced-price lunch or Medicaid at age four. Non-targeted students are not
eligible to participate in the program. Aside from participating, exposure to the
preschool program is limited to students’ association with program participants. As
a result, spillover benefits might arise through improvements in the school learning
environment—aspects of an educational setting that impact students’ ability to learn
(e.g., teaching pedagogy, social interactions, classroom decorum)—set in motion by
program participants. In this way, all exposed students may benefit whenever such
improvements occur.6 Lefgren 2004, Lin 2010, and Zimmerman 2003 each find positive
peer effects on later academic achievement, although these studies do not consider
the peer effects of preschool. Literature focusing primarily on the spillover effect of
3An exception to these findings is Lipsey et al. 2013, who evaluate the Tennessee Voluntary
Prekindergarten Program (TN-VPK). The authors find no significant differences between TN-VPK
participants and non-participants on most achievement measures at the end of kindergarten and first
grade. Additionally, the authors find a negative effect of participating in TN-VPK on quantitative
skills at the end of first grade.
4See: Feller et al. 2016; Kline and Walters 2016; Puma et al. 2012; Zhai, Brooks-Gunn, and
Waldfogel 2014
5See: Andrews, Jargowsky, and Kuhne 2012; Cascio and Schanzenbach 2013; Fitzpatrick 2008;
Gormley Jr et al. 2005; Gormley and Gayer 2005; Weiland and Yoshikawa 2013. Also, universal
preschool programs are not means tested, all preschool-aged students are eligible to participate.
6Given data limitations, I cannot directly examine spillover effects of preschool on program
participants nor targeted non-participants, only non-targeted students.
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preschool on academic achievement is scant. One exception is Neidell and Waldfogel
2010 who consider the relationship between preschool peer enrollment7 and math
and reading scores for a nationally representative sample of kindergartners followed
through first and third grades. However, unlike my paper, their empirical approach
lacks exogenous variation in the presence of peers who attended preschool. The
authors find positive peer effects of preschool on kindergarten math and reading scores
and first-grade math scores, with no effects present in later grades.
Important policy and empirical implications arise if spillovers from preschool exist.
First, if such effects exist, previous estimates of the own-effect of preschool on academic
achievement could be understated. Second, failing to account for spillover benefits
from the public provision of preschool programs could result in such programs being
underfunded. The current study seeks to determine whether or not a state preschool
program has positive spillovers on the later academic achievement of students. I
estimate the effect on the math and reading scores of South Carolina students in
grades 3 through 5 of implementing, in funded school districts, the South Carolina Child
Development Education Program (CDEP)8, a means-tested 4K program targeting four-
year-olds who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch or Medicaid. Specifically, I
exploit district and time variation in access to CDEP and use a difference-in-differences
design to estimate the effect across all students of CDEP exposure. Additionally,
I disaggregate (estimate separately) the effect by students’ CDEP-eligibility status.
Having the ability to disaggregate the effect by CDEP-eligibility status allows me to
test for the existence of spillover effects on the exposed, CDEP-ineligible students.
I find that the introduction and subsequent funding of CDEP not only increases
7In this study, students enrolled in any center-based care (Head Start, day care, nursery school,
etc.) are considered to have participated in preschool.
8The South Carolina General Assembly has, since the inception of CDEP, allocated funding to
the South Carolina Education Oversight Committee (EOC) to perform periodic evaluations of the
program. EOC concluded, in many of their evaluations, that CDEP participation has resulted in
modest academic gains in CDEP districts.
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the third through fifth grade math and reading scores of exposed, CDEP-eligible
students (by about 0.18 standard deviations) but also has positive effects on the third
through fifth grade math and reading scores of exposed, CDEP-ineligible students,
where math and reading scores increased by about 0.13 and 0.14 standard deviations,
respectively. Lastly, to examine a possible mechanism for the positive spillovers on
math and reading scores, I estimate the effect of CDEP on the number of disciplinary
incidents involving students. I find that CDEP leads to a reduction in the number of
disciplinary incidents among exposed, CDEP-eligible students but has no impact on
the number of disciplinary incidents among exposed, CDEP-ineligible students. This
result supports the possibility that CDEP indirectly benefits students, in whole or in
part, through improvements to classroom decorum via fewer behavioral disruptions.
Since 1994, South Carolina has provided funding to its school districts for half-
day 4K programs for disadvantaged four-year-olds via the South Carolina Education
Improvement Act (EIA)9. EIA requires at least one half-day 4K classroom for each
school district. Further, qualified four-year-olds in South Carolina have equal access
across school districts to both Head Start, the largest publicly-provided preschool
program in the United States, and the South Carolina Voucher Program, a program
which subsidizes child care services for children from low-income families up to age 13.
Compared to these other publicly-funded programs, CDEP’s eligibility requirements
are less stringent.10 In school year 2005-06, the school year before implementation of
9EIA was enacted by the South Carolina General Assembly in 1984. EIA established provisions
meant to improve the quality of the education system in South Carolina. In its current form, EIA
establishes a statewide kindergarten program, imposes a minimum instruction time of six hours per
school day, and creates a teacher incentive program to provide a financial reward to high-quality
teachers, among other things. Additionally, EIA increased the state’s sales tax from 4 percent to 5
percent to bring in additional revenue for education. A school district’s property tax base is not
considered when allocating the additional revenue from EIA funds to school districts.
10During the period of this study, income eligibility requirements for each program that offers
applicable childcare services in South Carolina were as follows: 1. Head Start: 100 percent of federal
poverty level (FPL); 2. The South Carolina Voucher Program: 150 through 175 percent of the FPL;
and 3. South Carolina Half-Day 4K and CDEP: up to 185 percent of the FPL (includes Medicaid
recipients). Additionally, parents must be working, in school, or participating in a training program
4
CDEP, 36 percent of CDEP-eligible four-year-olds in CDEP districts were not being
served by any publicly-provided preschool program. In the following school year, when
CDEP was implemented, the share of CDEP-eligible students who were not being
served by any publicly-provided preschool program declined to 25 percent. Thus,
the expansion of preschool can be interpreted as combining an increase in the total
number of eligible children who participate in a 4K program with an increase in the
length and quality of the 4K program provided to eligible children who participated
in a half-day 4K program.
Other studies have estimated the effect of the establishment and/or expansion of
a preschool program. Many of these studies evaluate universal programs. Generally,
these studies have demonstrated positive effects of preschool programs on cognitive
skills in the medium term, concluding that disadvantaged children tend to benefit as
much as, if not more so than, their more affluent peers. Fitzpatrick 2008 estimates
the effect of Georgia’s universal preschool program on the math and reading scores
of Georgia fourth graders, using a difference-in-differences design. In this study, the
test scores of Georgia fourth graders that were eligible to participate are compared
to the test scores of fourth graders not eligible to participate (those in other states
and before implementation in Georgia). The author finds that the program increased
the math and reading scores of disadvantaged children (those eligible for free or
reduced-price lunch) in rural areas. Cascio and Schanzenbach 2013 estimate the effect
of the publicly-provided, universal preschool programs in Georgia and Oklahoma on
fourth and eighth grade math and reading scores, using a difference-in-differences
design. In this study, the authors compare trends in test scores for Georgia and
Oklahoma, before and after the introduction of the programs, relative to the rest
of the country. The authors find that the effect of the programs was positive for
disadvantaged children (those eligible for free or reduced price lunch) on eighth-grade
to receive childcare subsidies via the South Carolina Voucher Program.
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math scores.
Ladd, Muschkin, and Dodge 2014 estimate the effect of a means-tested, statewide
preschool initiative in North Carolina, the More at Four Program (MAF), on the
math and reading scores of all North Carolina third graders. Through MAF, the state
provided funding to localities to provide slots for low-income four-year-olds in preschool
centers. The authors identify the effect of MAF based on within-county variation
across student cohorts in state dollars allocated to MAF and find that the program led
to increases in math and reading scores. Also, the authors do address the possibility
of spillovers from MAF by interacting the effect of exposure to MAF (residing in a
county where MAF was available at age four) with indicator variables for the mother’s
education and race. Their results provide evidence of spillover effects, although the
authors do not disaggregate their effect by low- and high-income status, the basis
for MAF eligibility. Dodge et al. 2017, using a similar method as Ladd, Muschkin,
and Dodge 2014 but examining math and reading scores in grades 3 through 5, also
estimate the effect of MAF and are able to disaggregate that effect by students’ free or
reduced-price lunch status to examine the possibility of spillover effects more directly.
The authors find that MAF had positive effects not only on students eligible for free
or reduced-price lunch but also on students not eligible for free or reduced-price lunch
and thus unlikely to have participated in MAF. Their result suggests spillover effects of
MAF. Despite similarities between the current study and previous studies, examining
the effects of preschool in a different setting using different data is important given
increased policy interest in preschool and, as a result, the need to ensure that findings
from other studies hold in different contexts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of CDEP, including eligibility requirements and program quality. Section 3 discusses
the data and the main empirical model being estimated. Section 4 reviews the main
results and compares these to the existing literature. Section 5 provides further
6
examination, including CDEP’s effect on student disciplinary incidents, event-study
estimates of the effect of CDEP on test scores, robustness and falsification tests, and
CDEP’s effect on test scores by race, gender, cohort, and grade. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 The South Carolina Child Development Education Program
Abbeville et al. v. South Carolina was a state Supreme Court appeals case that
began when three dozen rural school districts, together, sued the state over its funding
of education. The plaintiff districts argued that the state constitution’s education
clause had been violated. The Supreme Court interpreted the education clause as
requiring that the state of South Carolina provide, to each child, the opportunity
to receive a minimally adequate education as defined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, which concluded that inputs
into the educational system for the plaintiff districts (e.g., revenue, curriculum, teacher
quality, programs) were adequate, but added to the trial court’s opinion the observation
that the state had failed to fund early childhood education programs. As a response
to Abbeville et al. v. South Carolina, CDEP was created via a budget proviso by the
General Assembly in 2006. From its inception, CDEP provided funding for approved
public and private school providers in plaintiff districts to offer a full-day educational
program for disadvantaged four-year-olds residing in those districts. For the purposes
of this program, children are considered disadvantaged if they were eligible for free or
reduced-price lunch or Medicaid at age four. According to a 2014 report by the South
Carolina Education Oversight Committee (Education Committee), 60,000 four-year-
olds live in South Carolina. Approximately 71 percent of these children are eligible
for free or reduced-price lunch and/or Medicaid.
Children must be age four before September 1st of the applicable school year
to participate in CDEP, which is a voluntary program. From fiscal year 2006-07
7
through fiscal year 2012-13,11 funding for CDEP was made available only to public
and private school providers serving disadvantaged children from the plaintiff districts
in the Abbeville equity lawsuit. During this period, 36 districts received funding from
the General Assembly to provide full day 4K programs to disadvantaged children
residing therein. Table 1.1 provides the list of these CDEP school districts and
their corresponding CDEP launch years. Twenty-nine districts received funding to
implement CDEP beginning in school year 2006-07. In school year 2007-08, six
additional districts received funding to implement CDEP. In school year 2009-10,
the district of Saluda received funding to implement CDEP. The staggered timing in
which districts received CDEP funding was likely due to differences across districts
in the degree to which facility-related accommodations for CDEP students were an
issue for providers. In a survey of potential providers, space capacity for CDEP
students was reported as one of the biggest considerations for implementing CDEP.12
CDEP was further expanded in later years, but because the current study analyzes
data up to 2013, later expansions of CDEP are not included. Figure 1.1 shows the
geographic boundaries of South Carolina school districts and their CDEP launch years.
As shown, CDEP districts are not concentrated in any particular geographic area of
South Carolina.
The South Carolina Department of Education administers the implementation of
CDEP in participating public schools and the South Carolina Office of First Steps (First
Steps) administers the implementation of CDEP for approved private-providers.13 A
11South Carolina fiscal years end on June 30.
12Since space capacity for CDEP students was reported as an issue among potential providers, it is
plausible that class sizes in later grades could have been increased to create preschool classes. Given
research on class size effects, such an increase in class size would likely have led to negative effects on
academic achievement but could also have had no impact on academic achievement (Schanzenbach
2014).
13CDEP is limited to disadvantaged children residing in eligible school districts as determined
by the General Assembly. Providers documenting their service to such children may be eligible to
participate even if their facility is not located within an eligible district. (Source: First Steps)
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majority of CDEP students were enrolled in a public school, 89 percent as of school
year 2012-13. Approximately 4,716 children were served in a public school setting
by CDEP as of school year 2012-13. Additionally, in school year 2012-13, 11 percent
of CDEP students, representing approximately 600 four-year-olds, were served in a
private-center setting by CDEP (Education Committee).
The General Assembly issued general guidelines for providers. These guidelines
were meant to establish CDEP as a high-quality preschool program.14 First, CDEP
providers must operate five days a week, for 180 instructional days. During each
instructional day, CDEP providers must allow, at a minimum, 6.5 hours of service,
which must include outdoor activities that support the learning curriculum, rest
(1-hour maximum), breakfast, lunch, and a snack. Classroom attendance is mandatory
and recorded daily. Children are allowed a maximum of 10 unexcused absences per
180-day school year. CDEP guidelines limit classroom sizes to a minimum of 10 and
a maximum of 20 with an adult-to-child ratio not to exceed 1:10. In classrooms
of 10 children, the 1:10 ratio must correspond to a lead-teacher-to-child match. In
classrooms of 11 or more children, CDEP guidelines require that the class be staffed
at all times with a lead teacher and an instructional assistant.
Lead teachers must have obtained, at a minimum, a four-year degree in early
childhood education or a related field and must meet the definition15 of ‘highly qualified’
as defined under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). Additionally, CDEP teachers
are required to be certified in early childhood education and have experience teaching
young children. Instructional assistants must have obtained the minimum of a high
14The National Institute for Early Education Research (NIEER) profiles state-funded preschool
programs in the United States. Each state profile includes information on public revenue allocations,
enrollment in the state’s preschool program(s), and quality standards. NIEER established 10 primary
quality factors: 1. Early learning standards; 2. Teacher degree requirements; 3. Teacher specialized
training; 4. Assistant teacher degree requirements; 5. Teacher in-service; 6. Maximum class size; 7.
Staff-child ratio; 8. Screening, referral, and support services; 9. Meals; and 10. Monitoring. NIEER
determined that CDEP met seven of the 10 quality standards, falling short in meeting the quality
standards for teacher and assistant teacher degree requirements and monitoring.
15See H.R.1 (Public Law 107-110) via Congress.gov
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school diploma or its equivalent and meet the definition of ‘highly qualified’ as defined
under NCLB. Instructional assistants must have a minimum of two years of experience
working with children under the age of five and must have successfully completed or
enrolled in the Early Childhood Development Credential16 course within 12 months of
hire. Both CDEP teachers and their instructional assistants must attend at least 15
hours of approved professional development each year. All professional development
training hours must be approved by the South Carolina Center for Child Care Career
Development.
Lastly, CDEP also establishes guidelines for the curriculum taught by providers.
Each approved provider must offer an age-appropriate educational program that
follows an approved, research-based preschool curriculum that is aligned with the
South Carolina Good Start, Grow Smart standards—a set of statewide curriculum
standards for four-year-olds. Each provider’s program must focus on the developmental
and learning assistance children need to be prepared for school. Written lesson plans
outlining daily educational activities are required for each classroom for a minimum
of five hours per instructional day. The educational activities must focus on the areas
of language/literacy, math, science, social studies, fine arts, and social, emotional, and
physical development.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
1.3.1 Data
The data used in this study are from the following South Carolina agencies: the
Department of Education (DOE), Department of Health and Environmental Control
(DHEC), Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the Revenue and
16The SC Early Childhood Credential is offered through the South Carolina Center for Child
Care Career Development. The classes required for this credential are offered at each of the 16
technical/community colleges in South Carolina.
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Fiscal Affairs Office (RFA). RFA constructed unique identifiers common to all the
data-sets for linkage and provided district-level data.
First, the DOE dataset served as the starting point for the linkage of all the
data sets. Student-level data was obtained on math and reading scores for grades 3
through 5 from school year 2005-06 through school year 2012-13 and on the number
of disciplinary incidents for grades kindergarten through first from school year 2006-
07 through school year 2008-09. Any school infraction that results in a call home
to parents, a parent-teacher conference, detention, or a warning is counted as a
disciplinary incident. Table 1.2 shows the eight cohorts observed in the sample, where
cohorts 1, 2, and 3 are in the post period. The test score observations are highlighted
in light gray and the disciplinary observations are highlighted in dark gray. The
DOE dataset includes, for each student, the school and district attended, grade level,
gender, race, free or reduced-price lunch status, and math and reading scores for each
available school year. Between school years 2005-06 and 2007-08, the South Carolina
Palmetto Achievement Challenge Test (PACT) was administered, beginning in the
third grade, to South Carolina students. In 2009, the Palmetto Assessment of State
Standards (PASS) replaced PACT entirely. Test scores are normalized by test type,
grade-level, and subject.
A student would have been exposed to CDEP if, at age four, they resided in a
CDEP district after launch. In the DOE dataset, students are observed starting from
kindergarten, not age four. Thus, I assume that the district a child resided in during
kindergarten is the same district the child resided in at age four. Imputing the location
of a child at age four in this way may bias the estimated effect. Exposed students who
transferred to a non-CDEP district would not be treated as exposed. Additionally,
non-exposed students who transferred into a CDEP district in kindergarten would
be treated as exposed. If there are unique characteristics among movers that would
affect test scores, imputing the location of a child at age four could prevent me
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from identifying an unbiased, significant effect of CDEP. Given the limitations of the
dataset, an underlying assumption of the analysis is that movements between CDEP
and non-CDEP districts and within districts after preschool is random conditional on
the fixed effects and observables.
Second, the DHEC dataset provides, for all students in the DOE dataset who were
born in South Carolina, the birth year and a flag variable equal to 1 if the student’s
day of birth is on or before September 1st. Third, the DHHS dataset provides, for
all applicable students in the DOE data set, a month and year indicator variable
for Medicaid enrollment. The DHHS dataset, along with the DHEC dataset, allows
me to confirm, at age four, a child’s Medicaid eligibility. Additionally, a child’s free
or reduced-price lunch status at age four is imputed based on the child’s free or
reduced-price lunch status in kindergarten. Most students who are eligible for free or
reduced-price lunch are also Medicaid eligible.
Table 1.3 provides the summary statistics for Pre-CDEP cohorts by district CDEP
status. The table reinforces what is to be expected: CDEP districts have lower math
and reading scores, on average, relative to both the full sample and the non-CDEP
only sample. Also, CDEP districts tend to have higher percentages of Black students,
Medicaid and free or reduced-price lunch eligible students (and disadvantaged or
high-need students as a result), and a larger number of disciplinary incidents, on
average, than non-CDEP districts. Furthermore, CDEP districts tend to be smaller in
terms of student count and poorer in terms of revenue per pupil. Lastly, students who
resided in CDEP districts at age four overwhelmingly remained in CDEP districts in
later periods. Table 1.4 provides the summary statistics for students residing in CDEP
districts at age four before and after CDEP implementation. According to Table 1.4,
there was a modest gain, on average, in the math and reading scores of students
residing in a CDEP district at age four after launch, although average scores in math
do not appear to be statistically different between the two periods. Further, students
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residing in a CDEP district at age four after launch see a reduction in the number of
disciplinary incidents they are involved in, on average. In the summary statistics for
Tables 1.3 and 1.4, many of the mean differences are statistically significant, despite
the differences being quite small, because of the large sample size.
1.3.2 Empirical Model
The treated group for exposure to CDEP includes all children residing in a CDEP
district when CDEP was available at the time the child was four years old. For the
empirical model, I exploit district and time variation in the implementation of CDEP.
Given that the CDEP districts in my sample are the plaintiff districts in the Abbeville
equity lawsuit, CDEP assignment is not random. The main model being estimated,
using difference-in-differences, takes on the following form:
scoreigsdt = α + β1HighNeedi(age=4) + β2CDEPi(age=4)
+ β3CDEPi(age=4) × Posti(age=4)
+ β4CDEPi(age=4) ×HighNeedi(age=4)
+ β5CDEPi(age=4) × Posti(age=4) ×HighNeedi(age=4) + β6γt
+ β7γt ×HighNeedi(age=4) + β8γt × CDEPi(age=4) + β9Xi
+ β10Ydt + β11λs + β12τg + β13γt × τg + β14τg ×HighNeedi(age=4)
+ β15γt × τg ×HighNeedi(age=4) + igsdt, (1)
where scoreigsdt is the math and reading score for the ith student in grade g in school
s in district d during year t, HighNeedi(age=4) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
student, at age four, was either enrolled in Medicaid or eligible for free or reduced-price
lunch and 0 otherwise, CDEPi(age=4) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student,
at age four, resided in a CDEP district and 0 otherwise, CDEPi(age=4)×Posti(age=4) is
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student, at age four, resided in a CDEP district
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after the program was implemented and 0 otherwise,Xi is a vector of characteristics of
the ith student, which are the student’s race and gender, Ydt is a vector of district-level,
time-varying controls, which are the total revenue per-pupil levels (in 2013 dollars)
for each district by fiscal year and half-day 4K funding levels (in 2013 dollars) for
each district in the student’s preschool year, and igsdt is the error term, which is
clustered at the district-in-kindergarten level. In the presence of student fixed effects,
the treatment variables would no longer be identified and so student fixed effects are
not included. Additionally, the model includes a vector of year fixed effects (γt), a
vector of school fixed effects (λs), and a vector of grade fixed effects (τg). The school
fixed effects are included to control for unobservable, time-invariant differences among
schools that affect outcomes, year fixed effects are included to control for year-to-year
changes across all districts that could explain the variation in student test scores, and
the interaction of year and grade fixed effects controls for changes across cohorts in
all districts. School fixed effects are assigned based on the school attended in year t,
whereas the CDEP indicator is assigned based on the district the student resided in
at age four (as imputed from the district the student attended in their kindergarten
year).17 As a result, school fixed effects absorb the effect of residing in a CDEP district
at age four for students whose district CDEP status remains unchanged between the
school attended in kindergarten and the school attended in later grades. Students
who move after kindergarten, either from a CDEP district to a non-CDEP district
or vice-versa, induce within-school variation in the CDEP indicator that enables
identification of the β2 coefficient. Given this, the estimated effect of residing in a
CDEP district at age four may not be very informative and is not reported in the
main results.
The coefficients β3 and β5 are of primary interest, serving as the spillover effect
17Figures 1.2 and 1.3 demonstrate that school level variation in students’ CDEP status exists for
CDEP and non-CDEP districts.
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of CDEP on the individual math and reading scores for exposed, CDEP-ineligible
students and the differential effect of CDEP on the individual math and reading
scores for exposed, CDEP-eligible students, respectively. The effect of CDEP on the
math and reading scores of exposed, CDEP-eligible students is the linear combination
of the coefficients on the CDEP × Post and CDEP × Post×HighNeed variables
and is an intent-to-treat estimate since not all CDEP-eligible students participated
in CDEP (approximately 40 percent of eligible students participated in CDEP, on
average, during the program’s first three years) and I do not observe which students
actually participated in CDEP. As a result, the effect of CDEP on exposed, CDEP-
eligible students captures, in part, possible spillover effects of CDEP on the eligible
non-participants. The accuracy of the results rely on the assumption that changes
over time in the composition of students within districts is orthogonal to CDEP.
Table 1.5 examines the impact of CDEP on the district-level composition of students
and provides evidence that this assumption is met.
1.4 Main Results
1.4.1 The Effects of CDEP on Math and Reading Scores
Table 1.6 provides the effects of CDEP on third through fifth grade math and
reading scores. Column (1) of Panel A reports the effect of CDEP on math scores for
all exposed students. Based on this column, exposure to CDEP has a significantly
positive effect on math scores, increasing scores in grades 3 through 5 by about 0.17
standard deviations, on average. Column (1) of Panel A also controls for a student’s
high-need status. Notably, high-need students, on average, perform worse on the math
section of the state standardized test than non-high-need students by as much as 0.45
standard deviations.
Column (2) of Panel A disaggregates the effect of CDEP on math scores by CDEP-
eligibility status, the main focus of this paper. Recall that four-year-olds residing
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in CDEP districts during and after the program’s launch are eligible to participate
in CDEP if they are classified as high-need (either free or reduced-price lunch or
Medicaid eligible). Column (2) of Panel A includes the interaction of being in a CDEP
district after launch with the dummy variable equal to 1 if the student was classified
as high-need at age four. Based on this column, CDEP has a positive differential
effect on the math scores of eligible students (relative to ineligible students). Further,
column (2) of Panel A provides evidence of a positive spillover effect of CDEP onto
exposed, ineligible students, with math scores improving by about 0.13 standard
deviations. This result contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence in
a different setting that preschool programs may benefit not only their participants but
non-participants as well. Lastly, column (2) of Panel A includes the intent-to-treat
estimate of the effect of CDEP on the math scores of high-need students residing in
a CDEP district at age four after launch. The results suggest that exposed, CDEP-
eligible students experience an increase in math scores, on average, of about 0.18
standard deviations.
Panel B of Table 1.6 provides the effects of CDEP on reading scores. The results are
similar to those on math scores—CDEP, on average, increases the third through fifth
grade reading scores of exposed, CDEP-ineligible students and exposed, CDEP-eligible
students by about 0.14 and 0.18 standard deviations, respectively. The effects of CDEP
on math and reading scores are similar. In section 5.1, I provide suggestive evidence
that CDEP indirectly impacts test scores, in whole or in part, through improvements
to classroom decorum via fewer behavioral disruptions. Thus, the comparable effects of
CDEP on math and reading scores may be because of CDEP’s effect on non-cognitive
skills, which may impact subjects similarly. Carrell and Hoekstra 2010 show that
changes in non-cognitive skills that impact math and reading scores affect these scores
similarly. Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach 2018 examine the impact of school
finance reform and student achievement. The authors indicate that a $1,000 increase
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in annual per-pupil spending results in at least a 0.12 standard deviation increase
in math and reading scores18. Assuming their results can be generalized, CDEP’s
spillover benefit on math and reading scores is equivalent to a $1,092 and $1,225
increase, respectively, in annual per-pupil spending among CDEP-ineligible students
in CDEP districts. Overall, CDEP results in positive improvements on both math
and reading scores in grades 3 through 5. Furthermore, CDEP not only benefits its
targeted population, but also benefits non-high-need students, too.
1.4.2 Comparison of Main Results to Existing Literature
The coefficients on the CDEP ×Post variable reported in column (1) of Table 1.6
(Panels A and B) are the effects of exposure to preschool on third through fifth grade
math and reading scores, respectively, and are comparable to Dodge et al. 2017. In
their paper, students are exposed to the North Carolina preschool program (More
At Four) if they, at the age of four, reside in a county that received funding for the
means-tested program. I find an increase of about 0.17 standard deviations on the
third through fifth grade math and reading scores of exposed students compared with
an increase of about 0.08 and 0.09 standard deviations on the third through fifth grade
math and reading scores, respectively, of exposed students in their study. Per-pupil
spending on instruction averaged $3,700 from school year 2006-07 through school
year 2008-09 for CDEP compared with $1,100 per child at 2009 funding levels for
More At Four. Using these spending amounts, for every $1,000 spent on a CDEP
child, their math and reading scores increase by about 0.05 standard deviations. In
contrast, for every $1,000 spent on a More At Four child, their math and reading
scores increase by about 0.07 and 0.08 standard deviations, respectively. Given this,
CDEP is comparable to More At Four, with respect to impacts on third through fifth
18The authors examine fourth and eighth grade math and reading scores using data from the
National Assessment of Educational Progress. Specifically, they find that school finance reform
positively impacted funding and test scores in low-income school districts.
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grade math and reading scores.
The coefficients on the CDEP ×Post variable reported in column (2) of Table 1.6
(Panels A and B) are the spillover effects of preschool and are comparable to the
effects estimated by Neidell and Waldfogel 2010. In their paper, the authors report a
spillover effect of 0.08 standard deviations on kindergarten math and reading scores.
In comparison, I estimate spillover effects of about 0.13 and 0.14 standard deviations
on third through fifth grade math and reading scores, respectively. Differences in the
estimated spillover effects may be due to the fact that Neidell and Waldfogel 2010
control for preschool participation and thus, their estimated spillover effect is not just
on an ineligible pool of students but rather is on all students. Further, differences
in the estimated spillover effects may be due to differences in grade levels examined
and/or in spending amounts across the preschool programs examined. Students in the
Neidell and Waldfogel 2010 study are classified as having enrolled in preschool if they
participated in any of several types of center-based care programs, where spending
amounts are not reported. Thus, their study is not an examination of a particular
preschool program.
The effect of CDEP on the math and reading scores of exposed, CDEP-eligible
students is comparable to Fitzpatrick 2008 and Cascio and Schanzenbach 2013,
who estimate the intent-to-treat effect of universal preschool programs in Georgia
and Georgia/Oklahoma, respectively, on disadvantaged students. Fitzpatrick 2008
estimates an intent-to-treat effect of up to 0.12 standard deviations on the fourth grade
test scores of disadvantaged students in rural Georgia. Cascio and Schanzenbach 2013
estimate an intent-to-treat effect of up to 0.06 standard deviations on the eighth grade
math scores of disadvantaged students in Georgia and Oklahoma. In comparison,
I estimate an intent-to-treat effect of about 0.18 standard deviations on the third
through fifth grade math and reading scores of disadvantaged students in relatively
rural areas in South Carolina. Fitzpatrick 2008 and Cascio and Schanzenbach 2013
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report average per-pupil spending amounts of $4,010 and $3,946, respectively, across
the program(s) examined. Using these spending amounts, for every $1,000 spent on a
disadvantaged child in the Fitzpatrick 2008 and Cascio and Schanzenbach 2013 studies,
their test scores increase by about 0.03 and 0.02 standard deviations, respectively.
Thus, the intent-to-treat effects across these studies are similar to those estimated in
my study, although effects are identified across different grade levels across the studies.
Lastly, since CDEP districts are located in relatively rural areas, where access to
programs like CDEP may be more restrictive than in urban areas, I would anticipate
that the effects of CDEP on math and reading scores would be smaller if districts in
major urban centers were incorporated into the analysis.
1.5 Further Examination
1.5.1 Probing the Mechanism of Spillover Effects by Examining
Student Behavior
Similar to cognitive outcomes, some studies have found a direct impact of preschool
participation on non-cognitive outcomes (Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev 2013). More-
over, other studies have shown that the non-cognitive skills of a student can influence
cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes of that student’s peers (Carrell and Hoekstra
2010; Figlio 2007; Neidell and Waldfogel 2010). In the literature on peer effects
in education, peer effects might arise through improvements in the school learning
environment. If preschool programs result in better prepared students in the school,
as measured by improvements in math and reading scores, all students may benefit
as the teachers respond positively to better prepared students. Preschool students
could also share through social interactions the knowledge obtained in preschool with
their peers. Alternatively, if preschool programs result in better behaved students in
the school, all students may benefit through improvements to classroom decorum via
fewer behavioral disruptions. So, there can be several channels by which we observe
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spillovers.
Since I observe disciplinary incidents in my data, I examine improvements in
student behavior as one of several possible mechanisms by which spillover effects are
observed. For preschool effects on student behavior, results in the literature are mixed.
Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev 2013, evaluating the Perry Preschool program19, show
that preschool participation improved externalizing behavior (aggressive, antisocial,
and rule-breaking behaviors) in the long run.20 Loeb et al. 2007 show, for a nation-
ally representative sample of kindergartens, a negative impact (increasing effect) of
preschool participation (any type of center-based care) on socio-behavioral skills and
problems as reported by teachers, where behavior is measured as a composite variable
of self control, interpersonal skills, and externalizing behavior. Neidell and Waldfogel
2010 also find a negative impact of preschool participation (also defined as any center-
based care) on externalizing behavior in kindergarten. Although, Magnuson, Ruhm,
and Waldfogel 2007 show evidence that preschool programs located in public schools
do not have negative impacts on student misbehavior at school entry (kindergarten
and first grade).21 Differences in results across studies could be due to differences in
how discipline is measured, in how preschool is defined, and/or in the grade levels
examined. For peer effects of student behavior, a number of studies show that a
student’s behavior can affect the test scores of his/her peers. Carrell and Hoekstra
2010 find that, among third through fifth graders, students from troubled families
increase misbehavior in the classroom and decrease the math and reading scores of
their peers. Figlio 2007 finds that behavioral problems in grade 6 lead to increased
peer disciplinary problems and reduced peer test scores. Neidell and Waldfogel 2010
19The Perry Preschool program was a flagship preschool intervention program in the United States
that targeted disadvantaged, low IQ African Americans of preschool age.
20The study examines adult participation in crime, among other outcomes.
21Recall that as of school year 2012-13, 89 percent of CDEP students were enrolled in a public
school setting.
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show negative spillovers of disruptive behaviors on kindergarten test scores.
Recall, CDEP is a means-tested program, where students must be free or reduced-
price lunch or Medicaid eligible to participate. The main results provide evidence
of positive spillovers onto CDEP-ineligible students. A possible explanation for
the observance of positive spillovers is that CDEP is having a positive effect on
student behavior among its participants. As a result, test score improvements are
observed for exposed, CDEP-ineligible students through improvements to classroom
decorum. Table 1.7 demonstrates CDEP’s effect on student behavior, measured as
the number of disciplinary incidents involving a student. Data limitations restrict the
examination of CDEP’s effect on student behavior to grades kindergarten and first.
Table 1.7 demonstrates that CDEP leads to a reduction in the number of disciplinary
incidents among exposed, CDEP-eligible students, but has no impact on the number
of disciplinary incidents involving exposed, CDEP-ineligible students. This result
supports the possibility that CDEP indirectly benefits students through improvements
to classroom decorum. Given the possibility of racial and socioeconomic bias in the
reporting of misbehavior (Skiba et al. 2002), results of CDEP’s effect on the number
of disciplinary incidents should be interpreted considering the potential impact of such
biases on reported disciplinary outcomes. Specifically, reductions observed among
exposed, CDEP-eligible students could be driven by changes over time in reporting
bias. Although I do not observe student behavior in later grades, CDEP’s effect on
the behavior of exposed, CDEP-eligible students could persist in later grades. Also,
despite suggestive evidence that spillovers from CDEP might arise via improvements
to classroom decorum, other channels are possible (i.e., positive impacts on teaching
pedagogy and/or improved social interactions). Neidell and Waldfogel 2010 show
positive peer effects of preschool on test scores in kindergarten even after adjusting
for the impact of peer non-cognitive outcomes on students’ test scores. This suggest
that several channels may explain the existence of spillovers from preschool.
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1.5.2 The Event-Study Effects of CDEP on Test Scores
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 demonstrate the event-study estimates of the effects of CDEP
on math and reading scores, respectively. In these figures, the effects of residing in a
CDEP district at age four on test scores are disaggregated not only by CDEP-eligibility
status but also by cohort. CDEP Post cohorts are restricted only to include cohort 1,
the only CDEP Post cohort where test scores are observed for grades 3 through 5.
Specifically, the event-study effects being estimated, using difference-in-differences,
takes on the following form:
scoreigsdt = α + β1HighNeedi(age=4) + β2CDEPi(age=4) +
∑1
c=−4β3(c)Cohort(c)i
+∑1
c=−4β4(c)CDEPi(age=4) × Cohort(c)i
+ β5CDEPi(age=4) ×HighNeedi(age=4)
+∑1
c=−4β6(c)CDEPi(age=4) × Cohort(c)i ×HighNeedi(age=4)
+ β7γt + β8γt ×HighNeedi(age=4) + β9γt × CDEPi(age=4) + β10Xi
+ β11Ydt + β12λs + β13τg + β14γt × τg + β15τg ×HighNeedi(age=4)
+ β16γt × τg ×HighNeedi(age=4) + igsdt, (2)
where Cohort(c)i is an indicator variable equal to 1 if student i is in cohort c and 0
otherwise. I normalize β3(0) = β4(0) = β6(0) = 0. Normalizing in this way results in all
other cohort effects being estimated relative to cohort 0, students whose preschool
year was one year before CDEP launched in their district; this allows for the testing
of pre-trends—the possibility that math and reading scores, on average, were rising
before the launch of CDEP. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 plot the effects of CDEP on math
and reading scores, respectively, by cohort and CDEP-eligibility status for exposed
students. If there was already an increasing trend in test scores prior to CDEP, I
would expect that estimated cohort effects in the pre-period would be statistically
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more negative relative to cohort 0. Based on Figures 1.4 and 1.5, CDEP’s effect on
math and reading scores for eligible and ineligible students is robust to this alternative
specification of the main model. For students exposed to CDEP (cohort 1), effects
on math and reading scores remain positive and statistically significant. Moreover,
the negative effects observed among cohorts in the pre-CDEP period are insignificant
and, in some cases, measurably small. Thus, the positive effects of CDEP on math
and reading scores are not because of any steady, pre-CDEP increases, on average, in
math and reading scores in CDEP districts.
1.5.3 Robustness and Falsification Tests
The main results on math and reading scores are robust to a number of analytical
changes, although in some cases the effects are less precisely estimated. Specifically,
the main results on math and reading scores are robust to restricting the sample to
non-movers (Table 1.8), to PASS test scores (Table 1.9), and to cohorts observed in the
analysis on disciplinary incidents (Table 1.10). I restrict the sample to non-movers and
show that the effects of CDEP are not being driven by any unobservable difference(s)
among movers. Also, given that the state administered a new end-of-year test (PASS)
to students during the time period examined, I estimate the effect of CDEP only
among PASS test takers and show that changes in the type of test administered
are not driving the results. Further, given the effects of CDEP on test scores are
estimated over a larger number of cohorts than the effects of CDEP on the number
of disciplinary incidents, I restrict the sample to cohorts observed in the analysis on
disciplinary incidents for improved comparability and show the results are similar to
the main results on math and reading scores.
The main results on math and reading scores are also robust to a model with
limited controls (Table 1.11) and to clustering the standard errors at the student and
district-in-kindergarten levels (Table 1.12). Limited controls are used in Table 1.11
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to show that the primary source of variation identifying the effect of CDEP is at
the school level. Also, clustering the standard errors at the student and district-in-
kindergarten levels is done to account for multiple student i observations without
student fixed effects. Lastly, I test the validity of the difference-in-differences model by
randomly assigning students’ high-need status (Table 1.13). The results suggest that
there is something unique about actual high-need students as it relates to CDEP’s
effect on test scores. If the effects of CDEP are being driven by some unobservable
factor(s) then it must be the case that the unobservable factor(s) not only affected the
test scores of CDEP students but also affected test scores in such a way that targeted
CDEP students were most impacted.
1.5.4 Examining the Effects of CDEP on Test Scores by Race,
Gender, Cohort, and Grade
Additional analyses include examining the effect of CDEP on math and reading
scores by gender and race (Table 1.14), cohort (Table 1.15), and grade (Figures 1.6 and
1.7). Examining differential effects of CDEP by gender reveals that spillover benefits
are larger for males than females. Misbehavior may be more common among males
than females (Beaman, Wheldall, and Kemp 2006). Further, Carrell and Hoekstra
2010 show that peer effects of misbehavior are not only driven by disruptive males
but also largely impact male peers. Thus, larger spillover benefits for males is in line
with results from other studies, assuming student behavior is a channel. Regarding
differential effects of CDEP by cohort, the results show that CDEP improves the math
and reading scores of students in the targeted and non-targeted populations across
cohorts. Lastly, examining differential effects of CDEP by grade shows that the effects
of CDEP do not appear to fadeout. The persistent effect of CDEP on test scores may
be a result of CDEP’s effect on non-cognitive outcomes rather than a direct effect of
CDEP on cognitive skills.
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1.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, this study demonstrates that the introduction and subsequent
expansions of CDEP produce a significantly positive effect on the math and reading
scores of exposed, CDEP-eligible students. Specifically, exposed, CDEP-eligible
students demonstrate increases in their math and reading scores by about 0.18
standard deviations. Thus, CDEP benefits its targeted population. Further, the
current study disaggregates the effect by CDEP-eligibility status. Disaggregating the
effect by CDEP-eligibility status provides an opportunity to test for the possibility of
spillover effects among the pool of ineligible students. Based on the evidence presented
in this study, the introduction and subsequent expansion of CDEP leads to positive
spillovers onto the math and reading scores of exposed, CDEP-ineligible students. The
results suggest that exposed, CDEP-ineligible students experience an increase in math
and reading scores by about 0.13 and 0.14 standard deviations, respectively. Lastly, in
an effort to examine a possible mechanism that may be driving the positive spillover
results on math and reading scores, I examine CDEP’s effect on student behavior.
The results suggest that exposed, CDEP-eligible students experience a reduction in
the number of disciplinary occurrences they are involved in and that CDEP has no
impact on the number of disciplinary incidents involving exposed, CDEP-ineligible
students. This result supports the possibility that CDEP indirectly benefits students
through improvements to classroom decorum via fewer behavioral disruptions. Overall,
the results provide evidence that the effect of preschool participation on academic
achievement may be larger than previous estimates. Bigger own effects along with
spillover benefits suggest that targeted preschool programs could be provided at a
larger scale. As it relates to CDEP, additional efforts from policymakers to increase
the take-up rate are needed.
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Table 1.1 CDEP School Districts and Their CDEP Launch Years (as of School Year
2012-13 )
CDEP Launched in School Year 2006-07
Abbeville Clarendon 2 Florence 2 Jasper Marion 7
Allendale Clarendon 3 Florence 3 Laurens 55 Orangeburg 3
Bamberg 2 Dillon 1 Florence 4 Laurens 56 Orangeburg 4
Barnwell 19 Dillon 2 Florence 5 Lee Orangeburg 5
Berkeley Dillon 3 Hampton 1 Lexington 4 Williamsburg
Clarendon 1 Florence 1 Hampton 2 Marion 2
CDEP Launched in School Year 2007-08
Bamberg 1 Chesterfield Marlboro
Barnwell 29 Marion 1 McCormick
CDEP Launched in School Year 2009-10
Saluda
Note: Following school year 2009-10, there were no CDEP expansions until
school year 2013-14. The current study analyzes data up to 2013, so later
expansions of CDEP are not included. Source: South Carolina Education
Oversight Committee.
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Table 1.2 Cohorts Observed in the Sample (as of School Year 2012-13 )
Cohort -4 Cohort -3 Cohort -2 Cohort -1 Cohort 0 Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3
2005-06 3 2 1 K Pre-K
2006-07 4 3 2 1 K Pre-K
2007-08 5 4 3 2 1 K Pre-K
2008-09 5 4 3 2 1 K Pre-K
2009-10 5 4 3 2 1 K
2010-11 5 4 3 2 1
2011-12 5 4 3 2
2012-13 5 4 3
Note: Cohorts in the post period include cohorts 1, 2, and 3. Students begin state standardized testing in the 3rd grade.
As a result, I observe cohort 1 in grades 3, 4, and 5, cohort 2 in grades 3 and 4, and cohort 3 in grade 3. The test score
observations are highlighted in light gray. Also, disciplinary incidents are recorded starting in kindergarten. Disciplinary
records were provided for school years 2006-07 through 2008-09. As a result, I observe cohort 1 in kindergarten and
first grade, cohort 2 in kindergarten, and I do not observe cohort 3. The disciplinary observations are highlighted in
dark gray. The dataset also includes cohorts not exposed to CDEP. School assignment in kindergarten is known for all
students across the observed cohorts. Source: South Carolina Education Oversight Committee.
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Table 1.3 Summary Statistics for Pre-CDEP Cohorts by District CDEP Status (School Year 2005-06 through School Year
2012-13 )
Panel A: Student-Level Descriptives Full CDEP Districts Non-CDEP Districts DifferenceMean SD Mean SD Mean SD P-Value
% Female 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 (0.61)
% Black 0.40 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.37 0.48 (0.00)
% Hispanic 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.19 (0.00)
Years in data 2.88 0.47 2.89 0.50 2.88 0.46 (0.00)
Free or reduced-price lunch at age four 0.55 0.50 0.71 0.46 0.51 0.50 (0.00)
Medicaid eligible at age four 0.46 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.43 0.50 (0.00)
High Need at age four 0.62 0.49 0.77 0.42 0.58 0.49 (0.00)
CDEP at age four 0.20 0.40 0.94 0.24 0.03 0.17 (0.00)
Observations 232,720 44,541 188,179 232,720
Panel B: Student-Year-Subject-Level Descriptives Full CDEP Districts Non-CDEP Districts DifferenceMean SD Mean SD Mean SD P-Value
Reading Score -0.08 0.98 -0.31 0.96 -0.03 0.98 (0.00)
Math Score 0.09 1.06 -0.16 1.00 0.15 1.06 (0.00)
Number of disciplinary incidents 3.90 4.26 4.10 4.32 3.84 4.24 (0.00)
3rd Grade (% share) 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45 (0.02)
4th Grade (% share) 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 (0.50)
5th Grade (% share) 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48 (0.00)
Reading (% share) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 (0.68)
Math (% share) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 (0.68)
Per pupil revenue (2013 $s), district level 13,620 4,258 12,374 2,992 13,918 4,457 (0.00)
Average daily student count, district level 20,880 19,035 9,969 9,672 23,484 19,780 (0.00)
Half-day 4K allocation (2013 $s), district level 799,281 741,254 500,323 469,347 869,840 775,290 (0.00)
Number of districts 88 39 49
Observations 1,339,447 269,266 1,070,181 1,339,447
Note: Two additional CDEP districts included following consolidations of some CDEP districts. Test scores are normalized using
the universe of test score data. Subsequent sample restrictions alter the means and standard deviations from being zero and one,
respectively.
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Table 1.4 Summary Statistics - Students Residing in CDEP Districts At Age Four
Before and After Launch
Panel A: Student-Level Descriptives Before Launch After Launch DifferenceMean SD Mean SD P-Value
% Female 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 (0.01)
% Black 0.56 0.50 0.54 0.50 (0.00)
% Hispanic 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.20 (0.00)
Years in data 2.88 0.51 1.85 0.79 (0.00)
Free or reduced-price lunch at age four 0.71 0.45 0.72 0.45 (0.04)
Medicaid eligible at age four 0.59 0.49 0.57 0.49 (0.00)
High need at age four 0.77 0.42 0.77 0.42 (0.06)
Observations 48,831 20,623 69,454
Panel B: Student-Year-Subject-Level Descriptives Before Launch After Launch DifferenceMean SD Mean SD P-Value
Math score -0.16 1.00 -0.15 0.96 (0.24)
Reading score -0.30 0.96 -0.11 0.97 (0.00)
Number of disciplinary incidents 4.20 4.44 3.07 2.97 (0.00)
3rd grade (% share) 0.29 0.46 0.53 0.50 (0.00)
4th grade (% share) 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47 (0.00)
5th grade (% share) 0.37 0.48 0.14 0.34 (0.00)
Math (% share) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 (0.98)
Reading (% share) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 (0.98)
Per pupil revenue (2013 $s), district level 13,127 7,717 12,562 3,678 (0.00)
Average daily student count, district level 10,641 10,894 11,834 11,982 (0.00)
Half-day 4K allocation (2013 $s), district level 206,702 270,366 455,116 403,349 (0.00)
Observations 279,386 75,995 355,381
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Table 1.5 Effects of CDEP on the District-Level Shares of Minorities, Females, and
FRPL Students in Kindergarten
(1) (2) (3)
Share Share Share
Black/Hispanic Female FRPL
CDEP × Post 0.010 0.009 0.001
(0.025) (0.012) (0.022)
R-Squared 0.980 0.137 0.955
Observations 1,181 1,181 1,181
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the district level.
OLS estimation employed.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: If targeted students are moving into CDEP dis-
tricts to gain access to the preschool program, I would ex-
pect to see compositional changes in student demograph-
ics within CDEP districts after the program launched,
particularly across kindergarten populations. The re-
sults provide evidence that CDEP did not result in
compositional changes in student demographics within
CDEP districts. The models include the full interaction
of district CDEP status with year fixed effects and also
include district fixed effects. Given that district fixed
effects are included, the coefficient on districts’ CDEP
status is absorbed. The analysis was conducted using
district-level data (from school years 2000-01 through
2014-14) on the shares of minorities (Black/Hispanic),
females, and free or reduced-price lunch students in
kindergarten. Data was provided by the South Carolina
Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office.
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Table 1.6 Effects of CDEP on Math and Reading Scores
Panel A: Math (1) (2)
CDEP × Post 0.172*** 0.131***
(0.030) (0.038)
CDEP × Post × High Need 0.055**
(0.023)
High Need -0.454*** -0.452***
(0.021) (0.021)
Effect on exposed, CDEP-eligible students 0.186***
R-Squared 0.290 0.290
Observations 812,007 812,007
Panel B: Reading (1) (2)
CDEP × Post 0.175*** 0.147***
(0.024) (0.031)
CDEP × Post × High Need 0.037*
(0.021)
High Need -0.443*** -0.442***
(0.018) (0.018)
Effect on exposed, CDEP-eligible students 0.184***
R-Squared 0.237 0.237
Observations 810,654 810,654
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the district-in-kindergarten level.
OLS estimation employed.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The models include the full interaction of the ‘CDEP at age
four’ indicator with year fixed effects, the full interaction of the ‘high
need at age four’ indicator with the ‘CDEP at age four’ indicator, the
full interaction of year and grade fixed effects with the ‘high need at
age four’ indicator, school fixed effects, and individual and district
controls. Given that the coefficient on CDEP status at age four is
identified solely on students moving into and out of CDEP districts
between the age of four and the time of testing, the coefficient is not
reported.
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Table 1.7 Effects of CDEP on the Number of Disciplinary Incidents
(1)
CDEP × Post -0.061
(0.178)
CDEP × Post × High Need -0.237*
(0.141)
High Need 0.154*
(0.082)
Effect on exposed, CDEP-eligible students -0.300***
R-Squared 0.095
Observations 30,822
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the district-in-kindergarten level.
OLS estimation employed.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The model includes the full interaction of the ‘CDEP at age
four’ indicator with year fixed effects, the full interaction of the ‘high
need at age four’ indicator with the ‘CDEP at age four’ indicator, the
full interaction of year and grade fixed effects with the ‘high need at
age four’ indicator, school fixed effects, and individual and district
controls. Given that the coefficient on CDEP status at age four is
identified solely on students moving into and out of CDEP districts
between the age of four and the time of discipline observations, the
coefficient is not reported.
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Table 1.8 Effects of CDEP on Math and Reading Scores Among Non-Movers
(1) (2)
Math Reading
CDEP × Post 0.106** 0.125***
(0.047) (0.035)
CDEP × Post × High Need 0.068** 0.047**
(0.027) (0.022)
High Need -0.438*** -0.430***
(0.024) (0.020)
Effect on exposed, CDEP-eligible students 0.175*** 0.173***
R-Squared 0.294 0.242
Observations 715,596 714,418
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the district-in-kindergarten level.
OLS estimation employed.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The main results on math and reading scores are robust to
restricting the sample to non-movers. If movers differ from non-movers
in any unobservable way that affects test scores, a concern may be that
the unobservable difference among movers may be driving the results.
Restricting the sample to non-movers demonstrates that the effects of
CDEP are not being driven by any unobservable difference(s) among
movers. Moreover, although the CDEP indicator is not identified,
the school fixed effects control for the CDEP status, so the effects of
the CDEP × Post indicator are valid. The models include the full
interaction of the ‘CDEP at age four’ indicator with year fixed effects,
the full interaction of the ‘high need at age four’ indicator with the
‘CDEP at age four’ indicator, the full interaction of year and grade
fixed effects with the ‘high need at age four’ indicator, school fixed
effects, and individual and district controls.
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Table 1.9 Effects of CDEP on PASS Math and Reading Scores
(1) (2)
Math Reading
CDEP × Post 0.145*** 0.158***
(0.036) (0.028)
CDEP × Post × High Need 0.052** 0.031*
(0.022) (0.016)
High Need -0.499*** -0.485***
(0.014) (0.012)
Effect on exposed, CDEP-eligible students 0.197*** 0.189***
R-Squared 0.247 0.237
Observations 552,946 552,046
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the district-in-kindergarten level.
OLS estimation employed.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Given that the state administered a new end-of-year test (PASS)
to students during the time period examined, I estimate the effect of
CDEP only among PASS test takers. The results show that the effects
of CDEP on math and reading scores are not driven by changes in
the type of test administered to students. The models include the full
interaction of the ‘CDEP at age four’ indicator with year fixed effects,
the full interaction of the ‘high need at age four’ indicator with the
‘CDEP at age four’ indicator, the full interaction of year and grade
fixed effects with the ‘high need at age four’ indicator, school fixed
effects, and individual and district controls. Given that the coefficient
on CDEP status at age four is identified solely on students moving
into and out of CDEP districts between the age of four and the time
of testing, the coefficient is not reported.
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Table 1.10 Effects of CDEP on Math and Reading Scores - Restricted to Cohorts
Observed in the Analysis on Disciplinary Incidents
(1) (2)
Math Reading
CDEP × Post 0.152*** 0.168***
(0.040) (0.028)
CDEP × Post × High Need 0.064** 0.032
(0.028) (0.020)
High Need -0.235*** -0.201***
(0.041) (0.040)
Effect on exposed, CDEP-eligible students 0.216*** 0.201***
R-Squared 0.250 0.239
Observations 397,972 397,206
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the district-in-kindergarten level.
OLS estimation employed.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Given that the effects of CDEP on math and reading scores are
estimated over a larger number of cohorts than are the effects of CDEP
on the number of disciplinary incidents, an alternative approach for
estimating the effects of CDEP on math and reading scores would be
to restrict the sample to the same cohorts observed in the analysis
on disciplinary incidents. The results are similar—CDEP results in
positive improvements on math and reading scores for targeted and
non-targeted students. The models include the full interaction of
the ‘CDEP at age four’ indicator with year fixed effects, the full
interaction of the ‘high need at age four’ indicator with the ‘CDEP at
age four’ indicator, the full interaction of year and grade fixed effects
with the ‘high need at age four’ indicator, school fixed effects, and
individual and district controls. Given that the coefficient on CDEP
status at age four is identified solely on students moving into and out
of CDEP districts between the age of four and the time of testing,
the coefficient is not reported.
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Table 1.11 Effects of CDEP on Math and Reading Scores - Limited Controls
(1) (2)
Math Reading
CDEP × Post 0.125*** 0.214***
(0.031) (0.027)
CDEP × Post × High Need 0.038* 0.012
(0.022) (0.020)
High Need -0.569*** -0.559***
(0.019) (0.017)
Effect on exposed, CDEP-eligible students 0.163*** 0.226***
R-Squared 0.256 0.198
Observations 889,256 887,795
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the district-in-kindergarten level.
OLS estimation employed.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The models include the full interaction of the ‘CDEP at age
four’ indicator with year fixed effects, the full interaction of the ‘high
need at age four’ indicator with the ‘CDEP at age four’ indicator,
and school fixed effects. Provided these controls, the primary source
of variation identifying the effect of CDEP stems from the school
level. Specifically, there is variation in students’ CDEP status within
schools both before and after implementation of CDEP across CDEP
and non-CDEP districts. Given that the coefficient on CDEP status
at age four is identified solely on students moving into and out of
CDEP districts between the age of four and the time of testing, the
coefficient is not reported.
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Table 1.12 Effects of CDEP on Math and Reading Scores - Multi-Way Clustering of
the Standard Errors at the Student and District in Kindergarten Levels
(1) (2)
Math Reading
CDEP × Post 0.131*** 0.147***
(0.038) (0.031)
CDEP × Post × High Need 0.055** 0.037*
(0.023) (0.021)
High Need -0.452*** -0.442***
(0.021) (0.018)
Effect on exposed, CDEP-eligible students 0.186*** 0.184***
R-Squared 0.290 0.237
Observations 812,007 810,654
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the student and district-in-kindergarten levels.
OLS estimation employed.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Multi-way clustering allows me to cluster the standard errors at the district-
in-kindergarten level, the level of treatment, and at the student level, to account
for multiple student i observations without student fixed effects. The main results
on math and reading scores are robust to this multi-way clustering of the standard
errors. The models include the full interaction of the ‘CDEP at age four’ indicator
with year fixed effects, the full interaction of the ‘high need at age four’ indicator
with the ‘CDEP at age four’ indicator, the full interaction of year and grade
fixed effects with the ‘high need at age four’ indicator, school fixed effects, and
individual and district controls. Given that the coefficient on CDEP status at
age four is identified solely on students moving into and out of CDEP districts
between the age of four and the time of testing, the coefficient is not reported.
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Table 1.13 Effects of CDEP on Math and Reading Scores - Randomly Assigning
High-Need Status
(1) (2)
Math Reading
CDEP × Post 0.186*** 0.191***
(0.032) (0.027)
CDEP × Post × Placebo High Need 0.005 -0.005
(0.016) (0.019)
Placebo High Need -0.002 -0.015*
(0.009) (0.008)
Effect on exposed, CDEP-eligible students 0.191*** 0.186***
R-Squared 0.250 0.192
Observations 812,007 810,654
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the student and district-in-kindergarten level.
OLS estimation employed.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: I test the validity of the difference-in-differences model by randomly
assigning students’ high-need status. Given that the spillover effect of CDEP is
on the test scores of all exposed students, I still expect to observe a significant
spillover effect. The differential effects of CDEP on math and reading scores
should no longer be statistically different from zero since the effects are being
identified by a subset of non-high-need students. The results reinforce my
expectations. The differential effects of CDEP on the test scores of placebo-
high-need students is not statistically different from zero and the magnitudes
are near zero. The results suggest that there is something unique about actual
high-need students as it relates to CDEP’s effect on test scores. If the effects
of CDEP are being driven by some unobservable factor(s) then it must be the
case that the unobservable factor(s) not only affected the test scores of CDEP
students but also affected test scores in such a way that targeted CDEP students
were most impacted. The models include the full interaction of the ‘CDEP at
age four’ indicator with year fixed effects, the full interaction of the ‘high need
at age four’ placebo indicator with the ‘CDEP at age four’ indicator, the full
interaction of year and grade fixed effects with the ‘high need at age four’ placebo
indicator, school fixed effects, and individual and district controls. Given that
the coefficient on CDEP status at age four is identified solely on students moving
into and out of CDEP districts between the age of four and the time of testing,
the coefficient is not reported.
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Table 1.14 Differential Effects of CDEP on Math and Reading Scores, by Gender
and Race
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Reading Math Reading Math Reading
CDEP × Post 0.131*** 0.147*** 0.162*** 0.179*** 0.125*** 0.150***
(0.038) (0.031) (0.043) (0.038) (0.038) (0.032)
CDEP × Post × High Need 0.055** 0.037* 0.017 0.028 0.001 0.017
(0.023) (0.021) (0.028) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029)
CDEP × Post × Female -0.061** -0.063*
(0.030) (0.036)
CDEP × Post × High Need × Female 0.078*** 0.019
(0.029) (0.039)
CDEP × Post × Black 0.037 -0.018
(0.041) (0.035)
CDEP × Post × High Need × Black 0.057 0.044
(0.044) (0.041)
R-Squared 0.290 0.237 0.290 0.237 0.290 0.237
Observations 812,007 810,654 812,007 810,654 812,007 810,654
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the district-in-kindergarten level.
OLS estimation employed.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Columns (1) and (2) demonstrate the main results of the effects of CDEP on math and reading scores,
respectively. Columns (3) through (6) examine differential effects by gender and race. Columns (3) and
(4) show that the spillover effects of CDEP on math and reading scores, respectively, are larger for males
than they are for females. This result is not surprising given that I argue the mechanism through which we
observe spillovers on test scores is disciplinary incidents and males may be more likely than females to be
involved in such incidents. Further, the differential effect of CDEP on the math scores of students in the
targeted population is driven by female students (Column 3). The models include the full interaction of
the ‘CDEP at age four’ indicator with year fixed effects, the full interaction of the ‘high need at age four’
indicator with the ‘CDEP at age four’ indicator, the full interaction of year and grade fixed effects with
the ‘high need at age four’ indicator, school fixed effects, and individual and district controls. Given that
the coefficient on CDEP status at age four is identified solely on students moving into and out of CDEP
districts between the age of four and the time of testing, the coefficient is not reported.
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Table 1.15 Differential Effects of CDEP on Math and Reading Scores, by Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Reading Math Reading
CDEP × Post 0.131*** 0.147*** 0.126*** 0.151***
(0.038) (0.031) (0.043) (0.037)
CDEP × Post × High Need 0.055** 0.037* 0.036 0.008
(0.023) (0.021) (0.029) (0.028)
CDEP × Post × Cohort 2 0.020 0.010
(0.025) (0.025)
CDEP × Post × High Need × Cohort 2 0.032 0.046
(0.030) (0.037)
CDEP × Post × Cohort 3 0.108** 0.058
(0.041) (0.047)
CDEP × Post × High Need × Cohort 3 0.052 0.080*
(0.041) (0.043)
R-Squared 0.290 0.237 0.290 0.237
Observations 812,007 810,654 812,007 810,654
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the district-in-kindergarten level.
OLS estimation employed.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Columns (1) and (2) demonstrate the main results of the effects of CDEP on
math and reading scores. Columns (3) and (4) examine differential effects by cohort.
Differential effects of CDEP on test scores across cohorts may be due to changes in
how non-cognitive skills are impacting cognitive skills across cohorts. The results show
that CDEP improves the math and reading scores of students in the targeted and
non-targeted populations across cohorts. The models include the full interaction of the
‘CDEP at age four’ indicator with year fixed effects, the full interaction of the ‘high need
at age four’ indicator with the ‘CDEP at age four’ indicator, the full interaction of year
and grade fixed effects with the ‘high need at age four’ indicator, school fixed effects,
and individual and district controls. Given that the coefficient on CDEP status at age
four is identified solely on students moving into and out of CDEP districts between the
age of four and the time of testing, the coefficient is not reported.
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CDEP Launch Year 2006-07
CDEP Launch Year 2007-08
CDEP Launch Year 2009-10
Non-CDEP
Note: The geographic boundaries of some school districts are not shown because of
district consolidations. Source: US Census Bureau.
Figure 1.1 Geographic Boundaries of South Carolina School Districts and Their
CDEP Launch Years (as of School Year 2013-14 )
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Note: The figure demonstrates that school level variation exists across grades in the
share of non-CDEP students residing in CDEP districts before and after implementa-
tion of CDEP.
Figure 1.2 Average School Level Shares of Non-CDEP Students in CDEP Districts
by Grade and Launch Period
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Note: The figure demonstrates that school level variation exists across grades in the
share of CDEP students residing in non-CDEP districts before and after implementa-
tion of CDEP.
Figure 1.3 Average School Level Shares of CDEP Students in Non-CDEP Districts
by Grade and Launch Period
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Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the district-in-kindergarten level.
The regressions include school fixed effects, individual and district controls, and the
full interaction of year, grade, and high-need status fixed effects. I restrict CDEP Post
cohorts to include only cohort 1, where test scores are observed for grades 3 through
5. The 95 percent confidence interval is reported. OLS estimation employed.
Figure 1.4 Event-Study Estimates of the Effect of CDEP on Math Scores, by
Eligibility
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Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered at the district-in-kindergarten level.
The regressions include school fixed effects, individual and district controls, and the
full interaction of year, grade, and high-need status fixed effects. I restrict CDEP Post
cohorts to include only cohort 1, where test scores are observed for grades 3 through
5. The 95 percent confidence interval is reported. OLS estimation employed.
Figure 1.5 Event-Study Estimates of the Effect of CDEP on Reading Scores, by
Eligibility
44
.0
0
.1
0
.2
0
.3
0
.4
0
.5
0
E
ff
e
c
t 
o
f 
C
D
E
P
 o
n
 M
a
th
 S
c
o
re
s
3rd Grade 4th Grade 5th Grade3rd rade       t  r        5th rade
Exposed, CDEP-Ineligible Students Exposed, CDEP-Eligible Students
Note: The effects of CDEP do not appear to fadeout. This result does not provide
clear evidence that direct effects of CDEP on math scores do not fadeout. Instead, the
increasing effects of CDEP on math scores may be driven indirectly by a persistent
effect of CDEP on student behavior, a non-cognitive outcome. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the district-in-kindergarten level. The regressions include
school fixed effects, individual and district controls, and the full interaction of year,
grade, and high-need status fixed effects. The 95 percent confidence interval is reported.
OLS estimation employed.
Figure 1.6 Effects of CDEP on Math Scores, by Grade
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persistent effect of CDEP on student behavior, a non-cognitive outcome. Standard
errors are robust and clustered at the district-in-kindergarten level. The regressions
include school fixed effects, individual and district controls, and the full interaction of
year, grade, and high-need status fixed effects. The 95 percent confidence interval is
reported. OLS estimation employed.
Figure 1.7 Effects of CDEP on Reading Scores, by Grade
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Chapter 2
Free Lunch for All! The Effect of the
Community Eligibility Provision on Academic
Outcomes1
2.1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature that provides evidence on the importance of
children’s nutrition for academic performance (e.g., Glewwe, et al., 2001; Winicki
and Jemison, 2003). Further, because food insecurity and hunger are more prevalent
among children living in poverty, this serves as another channel for the persistence of
inequality. As such, policy makers have increasingly focused on interventions in child
nutrition as an instrument for both educational policy and anti-poverty efforts.
Starting with the National School Lunch Act, signed into law by President Truman
in 1946, there have been a variety of federal programs aimed at improving childhood
nutrition through interventions at school. As of 2016, between the National School
Lunch Program (NSLP) and the School Breakfast Program (SBP), over 30 million
student lunches and nearly 15 million student breakfasts are provided daily (USDA,
2018; USDA, 2018). The Community Eligibility Provision (CEP) program is a recent
federally funded program that was established as a part of the Healthy and Hunger-
Free Kids Act of 2010 in order to expand access to school lunches. As part of the
program, schools are subsidized to provide universal free lunch to students, regardless
1Williams, Breyon, John Gordanier, Orgul Ozturk, and Crystal Zhan. Submitted to Journal of
Human Resources, 3/4/2019.
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of an individual student’s eligibility for free or reduced lunch as part of the NSLP.
Proponents of this program posit several reasons why CEP might improve student
performance and student health. The primary reason is that CEP can increase
participation in the school lunch program among needy populations thereby reducing
nutritional deficiency among students. The first group that may benefit from CEP
are those that are needy, but not eligible for free or reduced lunch under the NSLP.
A family with an income just above the threshold for free or reduced lunch may yet
be food insecure. These students may face times when their families cannot pay for
a school lunch (Poppendieck, 2010). These families may also benefit substantially
from an income effect associated with the reduced financial burden of paying for
school lunches. In South Carolina, the setting of our study, universal school lunch
is estimated to save a family that was not on free or reduced lunch around $400
a year (Gaskin, 2016). These resources may be used in ways that benefit student
performance.
In addition to the ineligible students, CEP can also expand participation among a
considerable portion of students who are eligible (based on income) for free or reduced
lunch, yet are not certified for the program (Harwell and LeBeau, 2010; Dahl and
Scholz, 2011). This could be due to a lack of information for the parents, difficulties
in overcoming bureaucratic hurdles, or the social stigma that the parents may face
(Glantz et al., 1994). Finally, CEP may increase participation among the students
that are already certified for free or reduced lunch but do not take up the lunches due
to the potential stigma they encounter at school (Bhatia, Jones and Reicker, 2011;
Mirtcheva and Powell, 2009).
A second benefit of CEP is the reduced administrative burden to schools. Schools
are no longer required to collect and process paperwork under CEP. Nor do they need
to attempt to collect the fund from students who have unpaid balances. This could
allow the schools to use those resources elsewhere to improve performance. Relatedly,
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since schools do not have to process payments, this can also shorten lines and allow
for more time in the lunchroom for students to eat lunch, both of which have been
found to be determinants in school lunch participation (Marples and Stillman, 1995).
A third possible mechanism through which CEP could affect student achievement
is through spillovers onto students that already participated in the free lunch program.
There is some evidence that CEP improves behaviors among students, including
declined suspension and expulsion rates (Gordan and Ruffini, 2018; Kho, 2018) and
increased attendance rates (Schwartz and Rothbart, 2017). This may lead to positive
spillovers from expanding the program even onto students that already receive free
lunch from the improved behavior and performance of students who now participate.
In this paper, we investigate the effect of the universal free lunch program, through
CEP, in the state of South Carolina on the academic outcomes of elementary and
middle school students. CEP program was introduced to South Carolina in 2014. We
link student-level math and English test scores, as well as school attendance, to schools’
CEP adoption status between 2013-14 and 2015-16 school years. Using a difference-in-
differences approach with school-level fixed effects as our main identification strategy,
we find that the program improves elementary students’ math scores in the state
standardized tests by 0.06 standard deviations. Absences are also lower among
elementary school students. The effect on reading scores is smaller and statistically
insignificant. We find no significant impact on middle school students’ test scores or
absences. These results are robust to instrumenting for participation using a measure
of the potential cost of implementing the program.
Using administrative data on students’ eligibility for other benefit programs, we
are also able to examine the heterogeneous effects of the program by finer measures of
poverty. We find the largest effects for students that were eligible for free lunch prior
to implementation of CEP but not in a household receiving Supplemental Nutrition
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Assistance Program (SNAP) or Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF).2,3 This
income group of students are likely needy but may lack access to free lunch under
the NSLP. More interestingly, the magnitude of the effects on this group is inversely
related to the degree of poverty in the schools that students attend. When we interact
participation in the program with the urbanicity of the school, we find larger effects
on student performance in rural areas, although, we find larger declines in student
absences in urban areas.
Our work builds upon a recent paper by Schwartz and Rothbart (2017), who
utilize rich administrative data to evaluate the effects of universal free lunch on the
performance of middle school students in New York City. They find that the universal
free lunch increases participation in lunch for both students that were previously
eligible for free lunch and those that were not. Both groups experienced positive and
statistically significant increases in math and reading test scores. For the already
qualified students, the increase is 0.032 standard deviations in math and 0.027 standard
deviations in reading. The effect on other students is nearly twice as large.
There are, however, some notable differences between their work and ours. First,
our settings of study are very different from theirs. Our data comes from across the
state of South Carolina and includes substantial rural populations. This allows us to
make comparisons between the effects of the program on rural areas vs. urban areas.
Rural areas (along with principal cities) have a greater prevalence of food insecurity
than metropolitan areas (USDA, 2019; Piontak and Schulman, 2014), which suggests
that rural areas might benefit more from CEP. Further, rural locations have fewer
2It should be noted that for students that are not receiving other benefits, we only know a
student’s eligibility for free/reduced lunch before the implementation of CEP, as such eligibility is
not recorded in schools that take part in the universal lunch program. Thus, some of the effect might
be on students that were previously eligible for the NSLP, but would have been ineligible (or at least
uncertified) had the program not been expanded.
3Students who receive means-tested benefits are more consistently in poverty than students who
are on free/reduced lunch but do not receive other benefits. Also, students who receive SNAP or
TANF are automatically certified for free lunch while other income-eligible students need to apply
for it.
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policies that support healthy eating (Nanney, Davey, and Kubik, 2013) and are more
resistant to changes in school lunch programs (Cornish, Askelson, and Golembiewski,
2016). Second, our data includes information on whether the household where the
student resides is also a recipient of other benefit programs, particularly SNAP and
TANF. This allows us to consider the effect of the program on different levels of
poverty, not just whether the student receives free lunch or not. Michelmore and
Dynarski (2017) document substantial variation in poverty among children eligible
for subsidized meals and that this variation determines student outcomes. Third,
the students in New York City public schools are predominately poor, with about
90% eligible for free or reduced lunch. While our sample also contains schools with a
similar degree of poverty, there is much more heterogeneity. This allows us to consider
the effect of the program on students based on different levels of poverty in the school.
This could be particularly important if stigma deters students’ take-up of free/reduced
lunches under the NSLP (Glantz, et al., 1994). A poor student in a school that is
predominantly poor might face much less stigma than in a school that is relatively
well off. Finally, while they focus on middle school students, our data allow us to
examine both middle school and elementary school students. But we do not have the
information on actual individual participation in school lunch.
There are two other recent papers that look at CEP participation and academic
outcomes. Ruffini (2018) uses district-level test scores across states, exploiting the
timing that states become eligible for CEP. She finds that math scores improve by
about 0.02 standard deviations in the districts where adoption resulted in the largest
expansions of student eligibility for free lunches. Ruffini notes that those results might
mask gains from different types of students. In particular, she points out that the
marginal benefit for a student is likely different based on the student’s poverty level
and the interaction of student poverty and school poverty. Our paper complements
this work by exploring exactly these dimensions using individual-level data. Kho
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(2018) looks at the adoption of CEP in Tennessee and uses a similar research design
to this paper. He finds no significant effects of the program on test scores overall, but
a decline in disciplinary actions among high school students. However, again in that
paper, there are no measures of individual-level poverty, and he does not consider how
the effect might differ by school poverty.
Our work is also related to a pair of recent papers looking at the effect of the
adoption of CEP on health and behavior. In the first, Davis and Mussaddiq (2018)
investigate the adoption of CEP in the state of Georgia and find an increase in the
share of students in a healthy weight range. Given efforts to make school lunches
healthier and evidence that nutritional quality improves performance (Anderson,
Gallagher, and Richie, 2018), this is suggestive of another possible mechanism for
CEP to improve performance. In the second, Gordon and Ruffini (2018) use the
rollout of CEP across states to examine school discipline measures. They find modest
reductions in suspension rates among elementary and middle school students, with
the results largest in areas with high levels of food insecurity.
Finally, this paper belongs to the broader literature on the effectiveness of school
meal programs on improving student health and performance. In one vein of work,
several papers verify a positive relationship between availability of free lunch and food
security (Fletcher and Frisvold, 2017), free lunch and nutrition (Bhattacharya, Currie,
and Haddie, 2006), and overall health outcomes (Gunderson, Kreider, and Pepper,
2012), although possibly higher BMIs (Schanzenbach, 2009). Other existing work looks
at whether school meal programs do, indeed, improve performance. Hinrichs (2010)
uses changes in the NLSP administrative rules in the 1960s to causally estimate the
effect of participation in the program on outcomes and finds no short-term effect but
large increases in educational attainment. Frisvold (2015), Dotter (2013), and Loes-
Urbel, et al. (2013), find some evidence that school breakfast program participation
improves academic performance.
52
Our results add to the literature that suggests that free meal programs can improve
student outcomes. Given a fine measure of student poverty, we show the largest gains
from the program occur in students that are already receiving free lunch but are not on
other public benefit programs—the group that are likely to gain access when schools
switch from the traditional program to CEP. For policy makers, these results imply
that the universal free lunch program is beneficial to students from a low socioeconomic
background and that this can be an effective tool for improving performance and
closing achievement gaps.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II describes the background
of CEP and its adoption within South Carolina; Section III describes the data; Section
IV presents the econometric specifications; Section V comprises our main results;
Section VI considers mechanisms and robustness tests; Section VII discusses the
results and concludes the paper.
2.2 Background
Under the NSLP, lunch is provided free to students with household incomes up
to 135% of the federal poverty level (FPL) and at a reduced price to students with
household incomes up to 185% of the FPL. Student eligibility is established either by
submitting an application, which is then reviewed by local officials, or by categorical
eligibility. Students are categorically eligible, if they are participants in certain
assistance programs, such as SNAP, or if they are classified as part of a disadvantaged
status, such as homeless or foster children.
Under CEP, a school is eligible to receive subsidies to provide universal free lunch
if the fraction of students in the school that qualifies for free lunch through categorical
eligibility, Identified Student Percentage (ISP), is at least 40%. For schools that
receive a subsidy, the reimbursement rate is set as the ISP multiplied by 1.6. That
is, a school with a 40% ISP would receive funding to cover 64% of all meals, while
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a school with an ISP greater than 62.5% would be 100% subsidized.4 Finally, while
the program is generally restricted to schools with an ISP above 40%, there is an
exception if the district’s ISP exceeds 40% and the district chooses to participate at
the district level. Hence, if an eligible district chooses to participate at the district
level, a school with an ISP of less than 40% will also offer free lunch to all students.
While schools themselves are eligible for the program based on the school ISP, it is
critical to recognize that the actual participation decision is made by the school district
in South Carolina. That is, a district determines whether some or all categorically
eligible schools implement the program, or the district partakes in CEP as a whole
depending on the district’s eligibility. Yet school districts can also choose not to be
part of the program at all, meaning that none of the eligible schools will participate.
It is also important to understand why some eligible schools participate and others
do not, as this selection might inform on the appropriateness of different empirical
strategies. Since we study the adoption of CEP during the roll-out of the program,
information about the program played a substantial factor. Neuberger, et. al. (2015)
report on the adoption of CEP across states during the 2014 year and find that state
effort to inform and enroll eligible schools was a key factor in enrollment. South
Carolina, which the report listed among the states with a low participation rate,
has not historically embraced federal education programs.5 Further, many districts
were initially confused as to whether participation in the program would imperil
other funding that is made based upon free and reduced lunch rates.6 Thus, there is
4Because the reimbursement rate is not equal to the cost of providing a meal, the actual cost of
adopting CEP is more complicated than this suggests. We go into greater detail on the calculation
of the cost of adoption in the robustness section, where we use the cost as an instrumental variable.
5Prior to the 2015-2016 school year, the state Superintendent of Education was Mick Zais, the
current U.S. Deputy Secretary of Education, who had “famously refused to seek funding for several
federal education initiatives (Moore, 2017)."
6In response to a query as to why Richland County One District (the district which contains
much of the city of Columbia) chose not to initially adopt the program, the district Director of
Nutrition Services gave exactly this response (Gaskin, et. al., 2016).
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substantial variation among adoption even in schools with ISP’s above 62.5%. Finally,
among the informed schools with an ISP between 40% and 62.5%, the cost of the
program appears to be a key determinant for CEP participation choice (Moore, 2017;
Gaskin, 2016). These are reflected in the participation rates by ISP. Table 2.1 reports
the descriptive statistics regarding program qualification and participation over both
years.
While 68.5% of schools are eligible to participate over both years, only 25.2% are
participating. Elementary schools are more likely to be eligible than middle schools.
The average ISP across all schools is 47.3%, while the average is 64% among the schools
that participate in the program. In figure 2.1 we graph the share of eligible schools
that participate as a function of its ISP. For each year, the first graph represents
participation among all schools, while the second restricts this to just schools in
districts where at least one school participates in the program. The red lines in each
graph represent ISPs of 40% (the eligibility cutoff) and 62.5% (the fully subsidized
cutoff).
Across both years and all districts, 36.6% of eligible schools participate in CEP
(65.3% in the districts with at least one participating school). Overall, the share of
schools participating is increasing in the ISP share for both all districts and just the
districts that have some participants. This is suggestive that the costs (and benefits)
of the program do play an important role in the participation decision. There is also a
substantial increase in the participation rate across the years, reflective of the increase
in participation as districts become more aware of the program and familiar with its
implications. Given the discontinuity in the eligibility rules around 40%, one would
expect that there would be a jump in participation at that ISP level. Yet, this largely
does not appear to be the case. Looking at participation overall, there is no clear
jump in participation in the initial year. There is a possible jump in participation
at the 62.5% threshold in the second year, although this is somewhat unexpected
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as there is no discontinuity in the subsidy at that point. If we exclude the districts
that do not participate in CEP at all in the right panels, there seems to be a jump in
participation around the 40% cutoff in the initial year, but it is non-existent in the
2015-2016.
2.3 Data
For our analysis, we use administrative data from the South Carolina Department
of Education and the South Carolina Department of Social Services. We obtain panel
data of third to eighth graders for the school year 2013-14 to the school year 2015-16
from the Department of Education. We utilize one year of data prior to the rollout of
CEP in South Carolina and two years during which CEP was in effect. We acquire
end-of-year scores for state standardized tests of Mathematics (MATH) and English
Language Acquisition (ELA, which will be referred to as Reading from this point on)
and annual attendance records for each student. We also observe if a student was in
a household participating in the SNAP or TANF programs and whether he or she
received free or reduced lunch in a school year if the school does not provide universal
free lunch.
In addition, we collect school-level characteristics that may affect students’ aca-
demic performance from annual school report cards (also produced by the Department
of Education) and the Common Core Data from the National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES). These characteristics include total enrollment, the share of teachers
with advanced degrees, student-teacher ratio in core subjects, average teacher salary,
and the share of students with disabilities in a school year.7 We also gather information
on whether a school is a charter school, a magnet school, or some other types of special
schools, as well as the locality of a school. We exclude any non-traditional public
7Descriptive Statistics for these variables are given in Table B.1.
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schools from our analyses. As a result, our sample contains 670,392 observations from
332,761 students in 780 schools. About 73% of these schools are elementary schools.
Table 2.2 provides the basic descriptive statistics of our data. We observe differences
in the racial composition of students between the schools that participate in CEP
and the ones that either chose not to participate or were not eligible. Compared
to the students in schools that adopted CEP in 2015-16, the early participants are
more likely to be black (63.4 % vs. 60.4%) and from rural areas (83.5% vs 35.1%).
Both of these characteristics (race and rurality) are likely capturing the income levels
in the school district and poverty levels of student body composition. We observe
that in schools which are early adopters there are more students who are from TANF
household (5.5% vs 5.1%) or non-TANF SNAP households (55.2% vs 51%).8 In South
Carolina, the TANF income threshold is about 50% of the federal poverty level (FPL),
while the SNAP threshold is 130% of the FPL. (For free and reduced price meals, on
the other hand, the threshold is about 135% and 185% of the FPL, respectively.)
In Figure 2.2, we plot the mean of our outcome variables for each year since 2011
based on whether the school participated in CEP in both years, just 2015-2016 or
never participated. The figures on the left are for all eligible schools, while the figures
on the right are for those with an ISP greater than 62.5%.
While the levels between non-participants and the schools that participate vary,
presumably as a result of the differential poverty levels of these schools, there do not
appear to be any trends in the schools that participate in CEP that are not present
in the non-adopters.
8Since the eligibility for free/reduced lunch is not documented for students in schools that
have adopted CEP, we use the eligibility and social benefit status in the baseline year (2013-14) to
categorize the students into different income groups. According to the records during a three-year
pre-CEP period (2011-12 to 2013-14), about 11% of students in grades 3 to 8 changed their eligibility
status for at least once. Nevertheless, these students are likely from households with income close to
the cutoffs and, as discussed earlier, can potentially gain access to free lunch under CEP.
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2.4 Econometric Setup
We employ a difference-in-differences model to identify the treatment effects of the
CEP. Following Schwartz and Rothbart (2017), we formulate our baseline specification
as follows:
Yigst = β0 + β1CEPst × Elementaryigt + β2CEPst ×Middleigt
+X ′gstβ3 +M
′
stβ4 + γgt + δs + igst,
Y_igst is a variable reflecting outcomes for student i in grade g and school s in year
t. These outcomes include standardized math and reading test scores and absences.
CEPst is a binary indicator which takes a value of 1 if school s participated in CEP
in year t. Elementaryigt takes a value of 1 if student i is in grades 3 through 5, and
Middleigt takes a value of 1 if student i is in grades 6 through 8. Accordingly, β1 and β2
capture the effects of CEP on elementary school students and middle school students,
respectively. Compared to elementary students, middle school students, especially
the better-off ones, may enjoy more lunch options than the school lunches. Social
stigma may also be a more serious problem for middle school students. Xigt is a vector
of student characteristics, including gender, race, and individual poverty status. By
controlling forXigt, we can isolate the effects of CEP from the demographic composition
changes within schools. Moreover, we include in Mst other school characteristics9 that
may impact students’ academic performance and absenteeism. Since Mst may evolve
endogenously with a school’s adoption of CEP, in our empirical analysis, we start
without controlling for school characteristics, and then add them to the control set
and evaluate how that affects the estimates. Moreover, γgt is a grade-by-year fixed
effect, δs is a school fixed effect, and igst is a random error component. We choose
to use school fixed effects since the treatment is at the school level, but we explore
9Appendix Table B.1 provides descriptive statistics of these variables at the school level by ISP
and CEP participation.
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using student level fixed effects as an alternative.10 We cluster the standard errors by
school because the treatment is a school level intervention.
Given that only some of the eligible schools participate in CEP, there arises a
concern that endogenous participation will bias our estimates. While this is possible,
it is important to note that the inclusion of school fixed effects means that whatever
unobserved quality leads to selection and causes bias must be changing over time.11
Further, since the decision on participation is made at the district level, the unobserved
change that leads to bias must also be at the district level. Therefore, we believe
that the omitted variable bias is less likely to be an issue in our case. Nonetheless,
we explore using the instrumental variable approach in section 6 and find similar
results.12
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Baseline estimates
We estimate the above model using OLS for three outcomes: math test scores,
reading tests scores, and the number of days the student was absent in a school year.13
Table 2.3 reports these results. The odd-numbered columns report the results with
no school-level controls, and the even-numbered ones control for time-varying school
characteristics.14
10As a robustness check, we replace the school fixed effects with student fixed effects. The results
are comparable and are reported in Appendix Table B.2.
11It is also possible that students select into schools that offer free lunches. In Panel A of Appendix
Table B.3, we show our baseline analysis is robust to excluding students that switch schools (beyond
the switch from elementary to middle).
12Additionally, in Panel B of Appendix Table B.3, we show our results are robust to excluding
the districts where no school participates in either year to address the concern that selection occurs
at the district level.
13All test scores are standardized at the grade-year level. We utilized the raw absence records
without adjustments.
14Descriptive Statistics for these school characteristics are reported in the Appendix in Table B.1.
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In this table, CEP coefficients capture the overall effect of the program on elemen-
tary and middle school students when compared to their counterparts who are not in
CEP. In the parsimonious specifications, we find an average of 0.061 SD increase in
math test scores in elementary schools when they switch to CEP. Though the effect
is positive, it is not statistically significant for middle school students. The effect is
positive on students’ reading scores for both elementary and middle school students,
but is not statistically significant for either group. The insignificant impacts on middle
school students may be attributable to the fact that middle school students have more
outside lunch options and are thereby less likely to alter their participation in the
school lunch program. A more pivotal role of schools on students’ math than reading
performance may explain the differential effects of CEP on math and reading scores.
Moreover, the estimated effects on absences are negative as expected, implying about
a 1/5th of a day reduction on average in the number of days a student is absent for
elementary school students. The effect is larger but not significant for middle school
students. When we control for time-varying school characteristics, the estimates are
generally unchanged.
2.5.2 Heterogeneity of the treatment effect by poverty status
In previous work, free or reduced lunch status was shown to be a blunt measure
of student poverty and that more detailed measures of poverty were important for
performance (Michelman and Dynarski, 2017). Given this, we next exploit the fact
that we have information on whether the student resides in a household that receives
either TANF or SNAP. TANF receiving households are much poorer in general than
other households. Those that are in SNAP households are likely more consistently
in poverty than a household that receives no benefits but is on free lunch. More
importantly, students who receive TANF or SNAP are automatically certified for free
lunch under the NSLP, but other students who are also income eligible need to file
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applications for free lunch. To explore this, we interact our treatment variables (CEP
participation for elementary and middle schools) with the status of the household.
We do this for five groups: TANF households, SNAP recipients that do not receive
TANF, free lunch only, reduced price lunch only, and the households that pay full
price for school lunch. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 2.4.
The most striking result from this exercise is that the effect among the free lunch
elementary school students on both math and reading scores is large, statistically
significant and statistically different from the effect of CEP on more impoverished
students, i.e. those receiving SNAP or TANF. Nevertheless, the effect is positive on
the math scores of the poorest students. There is a negative effect on the students that
pay the full price, although it should be noted that since we are using the universe
of scores and normalizing them by year, we are measuring a relative standing. Thus,
this is not necessarily the case that absolute performance has declined.
Absences go down the greatest among the group receiving free lunch only as well.
Among middle school students there is a positive statistically significant effect only
on the math scores of the SNAP receiving households, although there is no significant
difference between the estimate for those households and those on TANF or free
lunches. There is no statistically significant effect on reading scores. Absences are
generally falling for all students in middle school, except those on TANF, with the
effect being between 1/2 and one full day reduction in absences.
These results highlight that the program has heterogeneous effects based on the
poverty level of the students. Overall it appears that the students on free lunch, but not
other benefits seem to have the largest gains. One possible explanation is that lunch
participation increases the most among these students. Previously under the NSPL,
parents may not file the application due to a lack of information or other obstacles.
It is also possible that the free-lunch only group includes students whose household
income fluctuates around the cutoff and may later become ineligible were CEP not
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introduced, since we determine the income groups based on students’ eligibility and
benefit status in 2014. Lastly, this group of students may be the ones for whom social
stigma is the most critical. We will examine this issue more in Section VI when we
look at these heterogeneous effects based on the poverty level of the school.
2.5.3 Heterogeneity by Location
Another source of differential treatment effects from universal free lunch maybe
through the location of the school. First, poverty is typically higher in rural areas.
Second, poor students in urban schools (living in urban locations themselves) are
more likely to have access to other free food sources such as churches, soup kitchens,
and food pantries than those in rural schools. The locality may also be associated
with differential social support systems. As a result, students in rural versus urban
schools may benefit from universal lunch differently.
In Table 2.5, we differentiate the treatment effects by the urban/rural location of
the school. The estimated effect of CEP on math scores is a 0.075 SD increase in rural
elementary schools, about 25% larger than our baseline effect, and the average CEP
effect on reading scores is double the size from our baseline and now is statistically
significant. In urban elementary schools, the effect on math is positive (0.03 SD),
but not statistically significant. The estimated coefficient on rural schools is in fact
significantly different from that in urban elementary schools on both math and reading
scores. Urban elementary schools have a larger decrease in absences than their rural
counterparts, but this difference is not significant.
For middle school students, there is a positive and insignificant effect on the math
scores in both rural and urban areas. In contrast to the findings on elementary schools,
however, there is a positive effect on urban schools reading scores and this effect is
statistically different from the effect on rural schools. This differential between urban
and rural performance by elementary schools vs. middle schools is puzzling. One
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possible explanation is that it is simply harder to improve reading scores in rural areas
in higher grades. Graham and Teague (2011) find that, controlling for socioeconomic
status, rural students that are struggling to read in elementary school continue to
struggle into later years, while urban and suburban differences narrow.15
2.6 Mechanisms and Robustness
2.6.1 School ISP Composition
In order to shed some light on the potential mechanisms, we next estimate the
effect of CEP participation based on the ISP share of the school. If stigma is a
dominant factor, then we would expect to see the largest effects in schools where there
are relatively fewer impoverished students. On the other hand, in schools with very
large ISPs, the effect of CEP is more likely to be through increased resources that
allow the school to invest in other areas to improve performance. In Table 2.6, we
report the effect of CEP by ISP for middle and elementary students separately.
For elementary school students, the effect associated with CEP on math scores
is positive and statistically significant at both the low-poverty schools and at the
high-poverty schools, but not for schools with an ISP between 40 and 62.5. The effect
on reading scores is only significant in the schools with relatively low poverty. The
decline in absence is also much larger at the schools with relatively low poverty. Among
middle school students, the coefficients on math score are positive, but insignificant
across school poverty levels. However, the effect on reading again follows the pattern
of a large positive effect in the relatively non-poor schools and a positive effect in the
most impoverished schools. These results are suggestive of a story related to stigma in
the non-poor schools and expansion of the program to previously ineligible students
15We also investigate the difference between students in rural and urban areas within the same
poverty group and depict the estimates in Appendix Graphs A1-A3. The pattern of the CEP effects
is comparable between rural and urban students.
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in very poor schools.
To explore this possibility further, we next look at the interaction between student
poverty measures and school poverty measures. That is, we want to understand if the
effect of CEP on relatively poor students in well-off schools is different than the effect
of CEP on poor students in poor schools. Figure 2.3 reports the composite effect
on math scores by student poverty level, school ISP level and elementary or middle
school.
Among elementary school students, there are large relative gains among the
free-lunch only students and the students who are not receiving free lunch in the
low-poverty schools, while the gains just accrue to the free lunch only students in
schools in the middle range of poverty. In the poorest schools the effect appears to
not vary among the students that receive subsidized meals and/or public benefits.
In particular, the effect of CEP on the free-lunch only students has a scope that is
inversely related to the school’s poverty level, and the differences are statistically
significant between the poverty levels of schools.16
Taken together, these are suggestive of a stigma story in the schools that have
moderate or lower levels of poverty. In those schools the effects are centered largely
among students that do not otherwise receive benefits and free lunches are possibly
more associated with poverty. At the same time, the effects in the poorest schools are
suggestive of a general improvement, perhaps from a reallocation of resources. Among
middle school students, there is a similar pattern in the relatively well-off schools, but
no sizeable effect in other schools.
Figure 2.4 presents the same picture for reading scores. The patterns are very
similar to the math score results. Again the free lunch only students experience
large gains in both low and moderate poverty elementary schools. In the poorest
16The F-stat for the difference in the CEP effect on free-lunch only elementary students in
low-poverty and mid-poverty schools is 15.9 (significant at the 1% level), and that for the difference
between students in mid-poverty and high-poverty schools is 3.49 (significant at the 10% level).
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schools, there is possibly a differential effect on reading, where again the free lunch
only students show the largest gains, but these differences are not all statistically
different. In middle schools, we have almost identical results to that from math scores.
Finally, in Figure 2.5 we do the same analysis for absences. In elementary schools
with low-poverty levels, there is a decrease in absences for all except the poorest
students. Among the moderate poverty level schools, there is a decrease again only
in the free lunch only students. There appears to be no effect in the highest poverty
elementary schools. For middle school students the estimates are generally not
statistically different from zero, although there does appear to be an overall reduction
of absences in the schools with moderate poverty levels.
2.6.2 Robustness
To address the concern of endogenous selection of schools into CEP, we employ
an instrumental variable approach in this section. Economic viability is the primary
concern for school districts to decide whether the district or a subset of schools should
switch from NSLP to CEP. Therefore, we evaluate the costs and revenues of schools
in these two programs at the baseline and use the difference in per student “profit”,
conditional on the schools’ eligibility for CEP, as an instrumental variable for CEP
participation.
We assume that schools provide the same lunches to all the students. So the total
cost stays the same no matter whether a school participates in CEP or not. The
revenue for schools under the NSLP comes from the federal reimbursement and the
prices paid by students for reduced and full price lunches. The federal reimbursement
rate varies for free, reduced, and paid lunches. The set of rates also varies for schools
whose share of students on free and reduced lunch is below or above (and equal to)
60%.17 In South Carolina, reduced lunch is always priced at 40 cents per unit. Yet,
17Source: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-07-26/pdf/2013-17990.pdf
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school districts determine their own price for the full-paid lunch based on the costs of
offering. Perhaps for the same reason, many districts also differentiate the prices for
elementary and secondary students.
The revenue for schools in CEP solely comes from federal reimbursement. As
mentioned earlier in the paper, the USDA reimburses 1.6 × ISP students, or all the
students if the former number exceeds 100%, and reimburses the remaining students
at the rate for free lunch that the school would otherwise receive under the NSLP.
Accordingly, the change in the revenue per student for a school to adopt CEP
is a function of the school’s share of students who are on free lunch, the share on
reduced lunch, the ISP, and the price of full-paid lunch, as well as the reimbursement
parameters set by the USDA. In theory, an increase in the revenue leads to a higher
propensity that a school participates in CEP. However, school districts may take many
other factors into account, while these factors are not observable to us.
Based on our calculations, the per student revenue change when a school shifts
from the NSLP to CEP ranges from -2.04 dollars to 4 cents, with a mean of -48
cents. We generate a binary variable as a second measure for revenue change, which
is equal to one if the revenue increase or stays the same if switching to CEP and zero
if it decreases. About 22% of schools would enjoy higher revenue or break even if
participating in CEP. Only 15% of the student observations are in these schools.
We interact the change in the revenue from the meal programs and the dummy
variable for non-negative change with a binary indicator for eligibility, which is set
to be one if a school’s ISP (or the whole district’s ISP) is above or equal to 40%
post-enactment of CEP and zero otherwise. We use the interaction terms as the
instrumental variables and estimate the effects of CEP on students’ academic outcomes
via the 2SLS. Table 2.7 presents the regression results.
Panel A reports the estimates from the first stage, and Panel B reports those from
the second stage. Base on Panel A, we find a significant and positive relationship
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between a school’s likelihood to take up CEP and the change in the revenue. In
particular, a $1 increase in the per student revenue (which represents a 30%-40%
increase) is associated with a 43 percentage points increase in the propensity that a
school adopts CEP; and having a non-negative revenue difference is related to a 50
percentage points increase in the chance that a school participates in CEP.
Using the change in the revenue directly to construct the instrument variable in
Columns 1-3 in Panel B, we find that CEP results in an increase of 0.08 SD in math
scores of elementary students, and this coefficient is marginally significant. We also
find that offering universal lunch reduces the number of absences by about 1.4 days
among middle school students. Compared to the baseline results in Table 2.3, the
point estimates from the 2SLS are in general comparable. This may indicate that
endogenous selection is less of a concern. However, the standard errors from the 2SLS
are much larger than those estimated by the diff-in-diff.
In the latter three columns of Panel B, the instrument variable is the interaction
between the dummy variable for non-negative revenue change and the dummy variable
for eligibility. The estimated coefficients exhibit a somewhat similar pattern. Yet it
is worth noting that the estimated impact of CEP on the elementary Math scores
is about three times the size of that estimated in Table 2.3. It is possible that the
dummy variable for non-negative revenue change picks up the effect of CEP on a
specific set of schools.
In considering the above results, three caveats may be in order. First, our calcu-
lation of revenue change may not precisely represent how school districts evaluate
the economic feasibility of CEP, as our calculation may overlook important factors
that determine districts’ decision of adoption. Second, the assumption that schools
serve the same food for all the students may not be valid. Lastly, school districts are
less likely to use a simple cutoff for non-negative revenue change to decide if schools
should participate in CEP. Hence, the dummy variable may place many schools on
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the wrong side. Nevertheless, the IV results do seem to be largely consistent with our
baseline estimates.
2.7 Conclusions
We examine the impact of a universal free lunch program, CEP, on test scores and
attendance of South Carolina students in grades three through eight. Although the
existing literature has estimated the impact of school-based nutrition programs on
achievement, this study considers the heterogeneous effects of the free lunch program
by socioeconomic background, school poverty levels, and rural-urban status. Using
a difference-in-differences design that exploits differences over time by schools’ CEP
status, we show that CEP increases math scores in elementary schools by 0.06 standard
deviations, on average. The magnitude of this effect is comparable to what is found by
some other papers on similar settings. (Examples include Dotter (2013) and Schwartz
and Rothbart (2017).)
When distinguishing the heterogeneous effects by socioeconomic status, using
students’ pre-CEP free- or reduced-price lunch status, SNAP and TANF participation
status, and student body socioeconomic status as proxies for socioeconomic background,
we show that, in all cases, the gains from CEP are largest for students that receive
free lunches but no other public assistance. These students might also be the students
for whom stigma is the most serious problem. We find that the gains are also larger
in rural areas than in urban ones. When we separate the analysis by student and
school poverty levels, we see a pattern where the free lunch only students gain largest
in the low and moderate poverty schools. In the poorest schools, the gains are spread
more equally across student income levels. These results highlight the differential
effects of the program across groups and the possibility of multiple mechanisms beyond
expanding access to previously ineligible students.
A few limitations need to be mentioned in interpreting the above results. First,
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unlike Schwartz and Rothbart (2017), we do not observe the actual lunch take-up
among students. While a fine measure of student poverty provides insight into the
heterogeneous expansion in school lunch participation, we cannot precisely determine
which students gain access to school lunch because of CEP. For the same reason,
we do not know before CEP was implemented, who did not take up school lunch
among the free-lunch eligible students and why they chose to do so. Second, CEP
only became available in South Carolina in 2014. With only two years of data on
academic outcomes post implementation of CEP, we are unable to examine if the
length of exposure to CEP affects students’ performance or if the positive effects we
find in this paper is long-term. Finally, as reported by Neuberger, et. al. (2015),
South Carolina is among the states with a low CEP participation rate. Therefore, it
is not clear whether the results we find in South Carolina can be generalized to other
states. Hopefully, these issues can be addressed by future research when relevant data
became available.
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Figure 2.3 CEP and Math Test Scores by School SES Composition and Student
Poverty
79
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Chapter 3
Who Does Aid Help? Examining Heterogeneity
in the Effect of Grant Aid on Achievement1
3.1 Introduction
Once nonexistent, merit-based aid now constitutes a considerable share of state
grant aid in the U.S. among undergraduate students, as many states have shifted
focus away from need-based aid towards merit-based aid.2 This shift has led to a
compositional effect on grant aid recipients, as high income students are now provided
the opportunity to receive new grant aid. Additionally, this shift led to a national
debate over how best to allocate grant aid dollars among low- and high-income
students.3 The debate is further intensified given the college-completion gap that
1Williams, Breyon. Submitted to Labour Economics, 4/1/2019.
2 Grant aid does not have to be repaid and is typically divided into two categories: merit-based
aid, which is based on academic ability, and need-based aid, which is based on financial need. Among
states, need-based-only aid accounted for 46 percent of total financial aid among undergraduates in
2015-16, down from 57 percent in 2002-03. During this same time-frame, aid that included some
merit-based component represented roughly 40 percent of total financial aid, up from 34 percent in
2002-03 (National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs 2016). Also, see Alon 2011,
College Board 2018, Ehrenberg, Zhang, and Levin 2005, Goodman 2008, Long and Riley 2007, and
Monks 2009, which discuss the shift towards merit-aid programs. Figure 3.1 displays the share of
total undergraduate state grant aid that is non-need based by year.
3 Those opposed to states shifting focus to merit-based aid argue that such awards dispropor-
tionately go to high-income students, many of whom would attend and graduate college absent the
aid (Doyle 2010; Long 2010; Wall Street Journal 2012). Some policymakers justify awarding grant
aid dollars to high-income students by arguing such aid would help to retain talented students across
the income spectrum within their respective states, although research shows that migration decisions
are not impacted by such aid (Fitzpatrick and Jones 2012; Levitz and Thurm 2012).
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exists between low- and high-income students.4
In order to determine how best to allocate grant aid dollars among low- and
high-income students, it is important to understand how these student types, as
it relates to academic achievement, differentially respond to grant aid. Given that
low-income students may be more liquidity-constrained, it is plausible to expect
that these students might be impacted most by grant aid (Dynarski 2000). On the
contrary, if additional aid creates or further perpetuates a wedge in the accessibility
of supplementary educational inputs5 between low- and high-income students, where
high-income students gain greater access to these inputs, perhaps high-income students
might be most impacted by grant aid. Considering total grant aid to undergraduate
students totaled $113 billion6 in school year 2017-18 (see Figure 3.2), approximately
0.6 percent of U.S. GDP at the time, optimal targeting of such aid would be impactful
if heterogeneous achievement effects of grant aid exist.
In this study, I examine whether grant aid impacts college performance and
completion and, if so, whether grant aid has differential effects for low- and high-
income students. I exploit the eligibility requirements of a state scholarship program,
the South Carolina Math and Science Scholarship Enhancement Program, using a
difference-in-difference-in-differences (triple-difference) design to estimate the effect
of grant aid. The program awards state merit-aid recipients with additional money
if they major in a science, technology, engineering, or math (STEM) field. This
targeted financial incentive not only could have a direct impact on achievement (via an
incentive effect) but also compositional effects on enrollment, major choice, and student
part-time work, all of which could impact achievement. To isolate compositional
4 A 2015 NCES study found that a college-completion gap exists between low- and high-income
students, with the latter group graduating at lower rates even after controlling for college enrollment.
5 Educational inputs that are not mandatory to purchase as a condition of college/classroom
enrollment.
6 This amount excludes loans and work-related aid.
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effects on enrollment and major choice, I estimate the effect of grant aid among a
subset of students already enrolled in college and who sorted between the STEM
and non-STEM choice prior to the program’s introduction. Having the ability to
isolate compositional effects on enrollment and major choice is important given these
decisions could directly impact treatment in this study. I also conduct additional
analyses to consider the possibility of an incentive effect of grant aid, which also could
directly impact treatment. Using student-level enrollment and financial aid data from
the University of South Carolina, I identify the effect of grant aid, estimated across
all recipients, by exploiting differences over time, by merit-aid recipient status, and by
major type (STEM or non-STEM). Moreover, I estimate the differential achievement
effect of grant aid for low-income students relative to high-income students to test if
grant aid impacts these student types differently, the main focus of the paper.
To preview the results, I find that grant aid impacts low-income, merit-aid recipients
most, increasing their GPAs and likelihood of graduation by 0.169 GPA points and
10.7 percentage points, respectively. I next examine work-study dollars earned, a
proxy for time-spent working, to consider differential work behavior effects of grant aid
by income as a potential mechanism for the differential achievement effects of grant
aid by income. Low-income students are more likely than their more affluent peers to
work while in school .7 This is important since several studies indicate that working
while in school harms academic performance.8 Further, many low-income students
work for financial reasons and among students that work for financial reasons, an
increase in grant aid is likely to change their work behaviors (Broton, Goldrick-Rab,
and Benson 2016; Lobel 1991; Scott-Clayton 2012). I find that the additional grant
aid leads to reductions in work-study dollars earned for low-income students only.
7 See: Broton, Goldrick-Rab, and Benson 2016; Roksa and Velez 2010; Scott-Clayton 2012;
Scott-Clayton and Minaya 2016; Walpole 2003.
8 See: Broton, Goldrick-Rab, and Benson 2016; Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner 2012; Darolia
2014; DeSimone 2008; Scott-Clayton 2011b; Scott-Clayton and Minaya 2016; Soliz and Long 2014;
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003.
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This result, coupled with the results on achievement, suggest that, among merit-aid
recipients, low-income students are impacted most from the receipt of grant aid as a
result of working less.
This study contributes to the existing literature on student aid by focusing on the
heterogeneous achievement effects of grant aid by income.9 Much of the literature
that examines heterogeneity by income in the effect of student aid focuses on college
enrollment, where the results are mixed.10 The literature examining heterogeneity by
income in the effect of student aid on college performance and completion, equally
important outcome measures, is scant. There are a few exceptions.
Alon (2011) examines the impact of need-based grants on college persistence for a
nationally representative sample of college students enrolled at four-year institutions,
using an instrumental variables approach and exploiting the discontinuity created in
Pell grant amounts that is driven by whether or not students have siblings attending
college. The author finds that need-based grants positively impact the likelihood
of graduating within six years for low-income students only, increasing graduation
prospects by 0.006 and 0.010 percentage points for every $100 spent on students in
the bottom and second-to-bottom income-quartiles, respectively. Despite the unique
source of variation identifying the effect of need-based grants, there are selection
concerns that, if present, would bias the estimated treatment effects on low- and
high-income students in Alon’s study.11 Further, examining Pell grants to consider the
heterogeneous effects of aid by income may not be ideal because many high-income
9 Previous literature has examined the effect of student aid on college enrollment (see: Castleman
and Long 2016; Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar 2006; Dynarski 2003; Fitzpatrick and Jones 2016;
Goldrick-Rab et al. 2012; Henry, Rubenstein, and Bugler 2004; Kane 2003; Kane 2007; Monks 2009)
and performance (see: Bettinger 2004; Castleman and Long 2016; Denning 2018; Dynarski 2003;
Dynarski 2008; Fitzpatrick and Jones 2016; Henry, Rubenstein, and Bugler 2004; Scott-Clayton
2011a; Sjoquist and Winters 2012; Stater 2009), with most of these studies showing that student aid
increases college enrollment and improves college performance, on average.
10 See: Dynarski 2000; Goodman 2008; Kane 1994; Klaauw 2002.
11 The additional aid may affect the enrollment decision and if such decisions impact college
completion, the results would be biased.
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students do not receive Pell grants (Protopsaltis and Parrott 2017).
Denning 2018, whose main focus is estimating the effect of financial aid on
inframarginal students (current college enrollees) at Texas public universities, conducts
additional analyses to consider the heterogeneous effects of student aid by income.
Specifically, students age 24 or older are considered independent for purposes of
applying for federal financial aid. Because of this, these students are not required
to report their parent’s information when applying for federal financial aid and may
receive additional Pell grant and federal loan amounts, as a result. Using a regression-
discontinuity design around the age cutoff for independent status, the author finds that
financial aid positively impacts the likelihood of graduating within four years for low-
income students only, increasing their graduation prospects by about 0.003 percentage
points for every $100 spent. Although Denning finds that there is no effect of financial
aid on graduation for high-income students, the fact that the additional aid amount
may vary across students within the low- and high-income groups makes it difficult to
conclude with surety that high-income students did not benefit from the additional
aid. Also, given that need-based grant and loan amounts could both be impacted
by the treatment, it is difficult to disentangle whether low-income students benefit
because of additional need-based grant amounts or loan amounts or a combination of
both. Nevertheless, the current study compliments Denning 2018 by examining the
heterogeneous achievement effects of grant aid by income among traditional college
students, those between the ages of 18-23.
In examining the heterogeneous achievement effects of grant aid by income, the
current study exploits a program design that is ideal. All treated students receive the
same aid amount, alleviating concerns that heterogeneity by income in the aid amount
might be biasing the estimated effect of aid within income groups, and treatment
only impacts grant aid, avoiding any issues with pinpointing which aid type(s) impact
achievement. Although the study focuses on a single grant aid program and does
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not compare need-based aid versus merit-based aid, the results provide a better
understanding of how states can efficiently allocate grant aid within merit programs,
which is relevant to the general debate about grant aid allocation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of the scholarship program, including eligibility requirements. Section 3 discusses the
data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 reviews the main results. Section 5 provides
further examination including robustness and falsification tests and the consideration
of differential part-time work effects of grant aid by income as a possible mechanism
driving the main results. Section 6 concludes with a summary of the findings and a
discussion of the policy implications of the results.
3.2 The South Carolina Math and Science Scholarship Enhancement
Program
The South Carolina Math and Science Scholarship Enhancement Program was
established, with little fanfare, near the end of the 2007 legislative session and took
effect starting in school year 2007-08. The program provides a financial incentive
for state merit-aid recipients who major in an approved STEM field.12 Specifically,
qualifying students are given a scholarship enhancement, a grant amount that is
awarded in addition to the merit-aid monies they are receiving. The scholarship
enhancement, awarded beginning in a student’s sophomore year, is an annual award
of $2,500 that is disbursed equally between the fall and spring semesters.13 To qualify,
a student must be a current recipient of either the Legislative Incentive for Future
Excellence (LIFE) scholarship or the Palmetto Fellows scholarship, two merit-based
12 Table 3.1 displays the list of approved STEM fields for the scholarship enhancement as
determined by the South Carolina Commission on Higher Education (CHE).
13 The scholarship enhancement is a sizable award, equaling roughly 30 percent of in-state tuition
at the costliest campus within the University of South Carolina system in 2007.
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awards for South Carolina residents.14 In addition, a student’s declared major must
be in an approved STEM field. If eligibility is met, the scholarship enhancement
is automatically applied to a student’s financial aid package, although the award is
limited to three school years. Further, students do not have to apply for the award.
A student who was a sophomore, junior, or senior, a recipient of either the LIFE
or Palmetto Fellows scholarship, and who was majoring in an approved STEM field
during the 2007-08 school year experienced an exogenous, positive shock to their aid
amount. This assertion is true so long as merit-aid recipient status and college major
choice are exogenous to the scholarship enhancement program.
3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Data
The data is from the Office of Institutional Research, Assessment, and Analytics
at the University of South Carolina and covers the institution’s multiple campuses
that are located across the state. The data is available at the student-term level and
contains enrollment and financial aid information for all undergraduate students from
school years 2004-05 through 2011-12. Enrollment information of a given student
include classification level (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior), GPA, course hours
carried, major choice, campus attended, and graduation date if the student graduated.
14 The LIFE scholarship awards up to $5,000 to first-time entering freshman attending an eligible
four-year institution in South Carolina. For initial eligibility, first-time entering freshman are required
to meet two of the following criteria: 1. Earn a cumulative 3.0 GPA on a 4-point scale upon
graduating high school; 2. Score an 1100 on the SAT or an equivalent 24 on the ACT; or 3. Rank in
the top 30 percent of their graduating class. In order to retain eligibility after a student’s first year
in college, a student must earn an average of 30 credit hours and earn a minimum 3.0 cumulative
GPA by the end of each school year. Recipients of the Palmetto Fellows scholarship are awarded
$6,700 during the freshman year and $7,500 in subsequent years, but the scholarship’s eligibility
requirements are more stringent. Unlike the LIFE scholarship, students cannot be awarded the
Palmetto Fellows scholarship if they were not initially eligible in high school. Further, the Palmetto
Fellows scholarship cannot be regained once loss. For a four-year program, both scholarships are
limited to eight consecutive terms from a recipient’s initial enrollment date. A student cannot be the
recipient of both scholarships (CHE).
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Student financial aid information include expected family contribution (EFC), serving
as a proxy for family income, and dollar amounts for the LIFE or Palmetto Fellows
scholarship, federal and private loans, earned work-study, other scholarships, and
grants. EFC is a dollar estimate of how much a family is expected to contribute
to their student’s college cost for a given school year and is determined by the U.S.
Department of Education based on students’ family income (among other things),
which is verified by financial aid offices. By design, lower income students have a
smaller EFC than higher income students. The data also contains the student’s gender,
race, birth year, county of residence, SAT score, and high school attended.
All students in my analysis are observed at all classification levels, although
freshman observations are not included because the scholarship enhancement is
awarded beginning in the sophomore year. Restricting the data in this way ensures
that compositional changes across time, in terms of student classification, do not
contribute to the effect of grant aid, especially if a concern is that a student observed
from freshman year to senior year is very different from a student observed in a subset
of that range. Given that students in the sample are observed at all classification
levels, estimated treatment effects do not take into account the effect of grant aid
among recipients that drop out of college before their senior year. Despite the
scholarship enhancement, these students may have been struggling academically. This
exclusion could bias the estimated treatment effect upward. In a later section, I
show that relaxing this restriction does not change the main conclusion. Also, all
students are observed, at some point, both before and after the introduction of the
scholarship enhancement program. The data sample does not include students who
were freshman in school year 2007-08 or later. These students would have known
about the scholarship enhancement and the awareness of its existence could have
impacted their decision-making. Further, all students opted into a STEM or a non-
STEM field prior to the introduction of the scholarship enhancement program and
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remained within their initial STEM or non-STEM choice after the introduction of the
program. Students can change their major within their initial STEM or non-STEM
choice. Given that students in the sample are not switching between STEM and
non-STEM fields, estimated treatment effects do not take into account the effect
of grant aid among recipients that opted out of STEM. These students may have
been struggling academically within STEM and decided to sort out of STEM as a
result. This exclusion could also bias the estimated treatment effect upward. In a
later section, I show that relaxing this restriction does not change the main conclusion.
Also, students that would have opted out of STEM but, because of the scholarship
enhancement, chose not to contribute to the identification of the effect of grant aid.
The inclusion of these students could bias the estimated effect downward.
Lastly, the data only includes students who completed the Free Application for
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), which is a large majority of all students observed. To
observe a student’s EFC, the student must have completed the FAFSA. Despite this
restriction, students observed in the data are well represented across the reported
EFC spectrum, which ranges from $0 (the poorest students) to $99,999 (the wealthiest
students).15 Table 3.2 provides the summary statistics for the sample. The data
sample is disproportionately more female, is roughly equal in terms of observations
where EFC is either greater than or equal to zero, and includes 4,263 unique students.
3.3.2 Empirical Models
Treated students in my sample are those who, starting in school year 2007-08,
majored in an approved STEM field and were merit-aid recipients. For the primary
empirical model that is used to estimate the effect of grant aid on GPA, hours carried,
and other aid sources, I exploit within-student variation. The basic model being
15 Although there is no maximum EFC, reported EFC values were top-coded at $99,999 during
the time period examined.
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estimated, using a triple-difference design, takes on the following form:
Yit = α + β1Postt × STEMi ×Meritit + β2Postt + β3STEMi + β4Meritit
+ β5Postt × STEMi + β6Postt ×Meritit + β7STEMi ×Meritit
+ β8Termt + β9Levelit + β10Termt × Levelit + β11Majorit
+ β12Campusit + τi + it, (1)
where Yit is the outcome for student i in term t, Postt is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if the observation is in or after the Fall 2007 term and 0 otherwise, STEMi is
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student’s major is in an approved STEM-field
and 0 otherwise, and Meritit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student is
either a LIFE or Palmetto Fellows merit award recipient in term t and 0 otherwise.
Further, Termt is a vector of semester fixed effects, Levelit is a vector of student
classification fixed effects,Majorit is a vector of major fixed effects, Campusit is a
vector of campus fixed effects, τi is a vector of student fixed effects, and it is the error
term, which is clustered at the student level. Student-level clustering of the standard
errors was chosen not only since the level of treatment is at the student level but also
to establish inferences about students not observed in the sample. β1 is the effect of
grant aid, estimated across all recipients, and, in a separate model, is interacted with
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student is classified as low-income, which are
those students with a zero EFC, and 0 otherwise to examine heterogeneity by income.
Aside from the data sample being roughly equal in terms of observations where EFC
is greater than or equal to zero, a considerable share of Pell grant recipients have a
zero EFC (Protopsaltis and Parrott 2017).16
16 Although the methodology for determining a student’s EFC is rather involved, certain students
automatically qualify for a zero EFC. Specifically, an automatic zero EFC is calculated for students
who meet both of the following criteria: 1. the student has a household member (as determined by
FAFSA) that is a beneficiary of a means-tested federal benefit program or the student’s parents are
eligible to file an IRS Form 1040A or 1040EZ or are not required to file any income tax return or the
student’s parent is a dislocated worker and 2. the student’s parents income is $31,000 or less for
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Since there is no within-student variation for the graduation outcome, I limit the
sample to each student’s last semester observed. For this outcome variable, the linear
probability model being estimated takes on the following form:
Graduationi = α + β1#ofPostY earsi × STEMi × EverMeriti
+ β2#ofPostY earsi + β3STEMi + β4EverMeriti
+ β5#ofPostY earsi × STEMi
+ β6#ofPostY earsi × EverMeriti
+ β7STEMi × EverMeriti
+ β8SchoolY earEnteredi + β9Xi + β10Campusi + i, (2)
where Graduationi is an indicator variable equal to 1 if student i graduated and 0
otherwise, #ofPostY earsi is a variable that captures the number of school years
a student is observed in during the post period, starting with the 2007-08 school
year. #ofPostY earsi takes into account the fact that the maximum number of
times a student could have been awarded the scholarship enhancement depended
on how many school years they were observed in following the introduction of the
scholarship enhancement program. Further, despite the fact that the scholarship
enhancement is limited to three school years, #ofPostY earsi takes into account the
possibility that the effects of grant aid are cumulative across school years. STEMi is an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the student’s major is in an approved STEM-field and 0
otherwise, and EverMeriti is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student was ever a
recipient of either the LIFE or Palmetto Fellows scholarship and 0 otherwise. Further,
SchoolY earEnteredi is a vector of school years, capturing the first school year
student i started college to control for cohort effects, Xi is a vector of characteristics
for studenti, which includes their gender, race, birth year, county of residence, SAT
school year 2011-12. Independent students with dependents other than a spouse must meet a similar
criteria.
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score, and major choice in their last term observed, and i is the robust error term.
In the model specified in equation (2), β1 is the potential dosage effect of grant aid
(estimated across all recipients) on the likelihood of graduating for a given school year,
on average. Also, β1, in a separate model, is interacted with an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the student is classified as low-income at any point and 0 otherwise
to examine heterogeneity by income. For readability, β1 in equation (1) and β1 in
equation (2) are both referenced in the result tables as Post× STEM ×Merit. For
causal identification of the heterogeneous achievement effects of grant aid by income,
the underlying assumption is that, among those treated, there are parallel trends in
achievement outcomes between low- and high-income students.
The triple-difference design takes into account the possibility that other programs
impacting all students, STEM students, or merit-aid recipients were introduced around
the time that the scholarship enhancement program was implemented. Specifically, the
estimated effect of grant aid on achievement is the the average difference in achievement
outcomes before and after the introduction of the scholarship enhancement program
among treated students, controlling for average differences in achievement outcomes
before and after the introduction of the scholarship enhancement program among
STEM, non-merit students, non-STEM, merit-aid recipients, and non-STEM, non-
merit students.
3.4 Main Results
3.4.1 The Impact of Grant Aid on GPA
GPA is an important achievement outcome as it is the standard measure of
academic performance and impacts the prospect of graduation. Further, the positive
GPA-earnings relationship, even after controlling for graduation, suggests that the
benefits of a higher GPA extend beyond college (Jones and Jackson 1990). Table 3.3
provides the effects of grant aid on GPA, estimated using within-student variation.
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Columns (1) and (2) report the estimated effect of grant aid, with and without controls,
respectively. Based on these results, grant aid appears to have no impact on GPA,
on average. This finding is similar to Denning 2018, who shows no impact of aid on
GPA, on average.
Column (3) tests, among merit-aid recipients, whether the impact of grant aid on
GPA differs for low- and high-income students, the main focus of the paper. In column
(3), the coefficient on Post× STEM ×Merit× LowIncome is the differential effect
of grant aid on low-income students and tests whether or not the effect of grant aid on
GPA is significantly different for these students. The overall effect of grant aid on GPA
for low-income students is the linear combination of the Post× STEM ×Merit and
Post× STEM ×Merit× LowIncome coefficients. Based on column (3), the effect
of grant aid on GPA is significantly higher (0.192) for low-income students relative
to their high-income peers. In fact, grant aid does not impact GPA for high-income
students at all—the effect for high income students (-0.050) is not statistically different
from zero. For low-income students, grant aid increases their GPA by 0.142 GPA
points, on average.
Column (4), displaying the preferred results, takes into account the possibility that
the heterogeneous effects of grant aid by income observed are capturing heterogeneous
effects of grant aid by skill. In this model, the treatment variable (β1) is also interacted
with an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student’s SAT score is below the median
(1110) and 0 otherwise. Goodman 2008 cautions against examining heterogeneous
effects by income without taking into account the possibility of heterogeneous effects
by skill since, in some instances, skill and income may be positively correlated. Based
on column (4), the results are robust to controlling for heterogeneous effects by skill.
For low-income students, grant aid increases their GPA by 0.169 GPA points, on
average.
Among those treated, low-income students in the sample were awarded the schol-
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arship enhancement in a total of five terms (2.5 school years), on average. As a
result, these students were awarded a total of $6,250, on average. Henry, Rubenstein,
and Bugler 2004 and Scott-Clayton 2011a find that, on average, merit aid increases
GPA by as much as 0.170 and 0.160 GPA points over four years, respectively. Henry,
Rubenstein, and Bugler 2004 examine the impact of Georgia’s HOPE scholarship
program on students that graduated from a Georgia high school and enrolled at an
institution within the University of Georgia system. The program awarded students
in their sample with roughly up to $10,000 over a four-year period, assuming students
did not lose the scholarship. For comparison, $6,250 spent on students in the Henry,
Rubenstein, and Bugler 2004 study would increase GPAs by at least 0.11 GPA points,
on average. Scott-Clayton 2011a examines the impact of West Virginia’s PROMISE
scholarship on students enrolled in a West Virginia public institution. Under the
PROMISE scholarship, students in the sample were awarded $10,000 over a four-year
period, on average. For comparison, $6,250 spent on students in the Scott-Clayton
2011a study would increase GPAs by 0.10 GPA points, on average. Given that I am
able to isolate the achievement effect of grant aid from compositional changes that
could impact treatment status, I might expect my estimate to be larger than the
estimates from previous studies. On the contrary, I might expect my estimate to be
smaller than the estimates from previous studies given that treated students in my
study are high achievers in two dimensions (STEM majors and merit-aid recipients),
perhaps with relatively little room for improvement.
3.4.2 The Impact of Grant Aid on College Completion
In examining the impact of grant aid on college completion, I estimate the effects
of grant aid on the likelihood of graduating. In the model for graduation, I am no
longer able to exploit within-student variation (Equation 2). Table 3.4 provides the
effects of grant aid on the likelihood of graduating. Based on column (1), grant
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aid has no impact on the likelihood of graduating, on average. This result remains
in column (2), where controls are added. In comparison, Dynarski 2008 finds that
merit aid increases college completion rates for four-year degrees by 2.5 percentage
points, exploiting merit programs in Arkansas and Georgia. Between these programs,
students could have received an award amount between $10,000 and $12,000 across
a four-year period, although it is unclear what the average award amount was for
treated students. Scott-Clayton 2011a finds a 9.4 and 4.5 percentage point increase
in four-year and five-year graduation rates, respectively. Castleman and Long 2016,
examining the impact of a need-based grant, the Florida Student Access Grant, on
students enrolled at Florida public institutions, find that an additional $1,300 in grant
aid eligibility increased six-year graduation rates by 4.6 percentage points. Results
across the studies may vary because of differences in how college completion is defined
and/or in the type(s) of students that are treated.
When heterogeneity by income is considered, the results demonstrate that, among
merit-aid recipients, only low-income students benefit. For low-income students,
grant aid increases the likelihood of graduating by 10.7 percentage points for each
school year received, on average (the preferred results). Low-income students received
the scholarship enhancement in a total of 2.5 school years, on average. Recall, a
low-income student receiving the scholarship enhancement for 2.5 school years would
receive $6,250. The likelihood of graduating for these students would increase by 26.7
percentage points (10.7 × 2.5). For comparison, $6,250 spent on the poorest student
in the Alon (2011) study increases the likelihood of graduating within six years by
roughly 38 percentage points. Also, $6,250 spent on a low-income student in the
Denning (2018) study increases the likelihood of graduating within four years by 16.1
percentage points.
Results show that grant aid increases the likelihood of graduating for low-income
students only. Given that result, I examine, among graduates, whether or not grant
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aid decreased their time-to-degree. Table 3.5 presents the results of that analysis. The
results are similar to the main findings on graduation—among merit-aid recipients,
grant aid impacts low-income students most. For these students, grant aid increases
their likelihood of graduating within six years by 3.7 percentage points per school year
received, on average. Table 3.6 displays the results of the effects of grant aid on an
alternative measure of college completion—the ‘on-track to graduate’ measure. The
‘on-track to graduate’ measure is a practical alternative to the graduation outcome
variable, which does not vary within student. A student is considered on-track to
graduate if, in any given term, they have accumulated enough credit hours to have
earned at least 30 credit hours by the end of the school year. The results on the
‘on-track to graduate’ measure are similar to those on GPA and the likelihood of
graduating—low-income, merit-aid recipients are most impacted. Specifically, grant
aid increases the likelihood of being on-track to graduate by 14.7 percentage points
for low-income students yet has no impact on high-income students, based on the
preferred setup.
3.5 Further Examination
3.5.1 Robustness and Falsification Tests
Students in the sample are observed at all classification levels and remain within
their initial STEM or non-STEM choice after the introduction of the program. These
sample restrictions could bias the estimated treatment effect upward. Table 3.7
provides the effects of grant aid on GPA and the likelihood of graduating, including in
the sample students that drop out of college before their senior year and students that
opted out of STEM. Despite this inclusion, the differential achievement effects of grant
aid on low-income students remains positive and statistically significant. Although the
overall effects for these students are less precisely estimated and smaller in magnitude,
with the effect on GPA being negative, the estimates are likely biased downward given
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the inclusion of students that would have opted out of STEM but, because of the
financial incentive, do not. It is unclear which students are incentivized in this way.
Nevertheless, the positive and statistically significant differential achievement effects
of grant aid on low-income students provides further evidence that grant aid likely
impacts the GPA and graduation prospects of these students most.
The financial incentive made possible via the scholarship enhancement program
provided an exogenous, positive shock to the aid amount of recipients whose merit-
aid recipient status and college major choice were not impacted by the program.
Recall, students in the sample opted into a STEM or a non-STEM field prior to the
introduction of the program, thus are not induced by the program with respect to
their college major choice. Table 3.8 tests the possibility that the program induced
students at or near the GPA cutoff for a merit-aid award (3.0) to improve their
academic performance, thus impacting their merit-aid recipient status. If the effects
of grant aid are solely driven by students whose GPA is at or near the GPA cutoff for
a merit-aid award, it would be difficult to argue against the possibility that merit-aid
recipient status is exogenous to the scholarship enhancement program. Low-income
students below but near the GPA cutoff for a merit-aid award may be induced by
the scholarship enhancement program to increase their GPA, thus explaining the
differential achievement effect of grant aid on low-income students. For this analysis,
a low GPA is one that is less than or equal to the median GPA in the sample (3.3).
For GPA and the likelihood of graduating, the differential achievement effects of grant
aid on low-income students remain positive and statistically significant for students
with low and high GPAs, making it less likely that effects are solely driven by students
whose merit-aid recipient status are impacted by the scholarship enhancement program.
Aside from this analysis, it seems unlikely that students below but near the GPA cutoff
for a merit-aid award would not have been induced by the already established state
merit program to improve their GPA standing absent the scholarship enhancement
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program, assuming they were by the scholarship enhancement program.
Table 3.9 provides the effects of grant aid on GPA and the likelihood of graduating,
estimating the differential effects of alternative income groups. In this analysis, I
classify each student in the sample as one of the following: always Pell eligible with
a zero EFC, always Pell eligible but not always having a zero EFC, sometimes Pell
eligible, and never Pell eligible. For the GPA outcome, the differential effect of grant
aid on students who are always Pell eligible with a zero EFC is positive and statistically
significant. The overall effect of grant aid on GPA for these students is also positive,
although imprecisely estimated. For all other students, overall effects of grant aid on
GPA are negative, although imprecisely estimated. For the graduation outcome, the
differential effect of grant aid on students who are always Pell eligible with a zero EFC
is positive, although imprecisely estimated. Further, the overall effect of grant aid
on these students is positive and statistically significant. For all other students, the
effects of grant aid are smaller and mostly imprecisely estimated. Overall, the results
suggest that students who are always Pell eligible with a zero EFC are most impacted
by grant aid. This analysis provides further justification for classifying low-income
students as those with a zero EFC.
Table 3.10 provides results from an analysis that examines the possibility that
the main results are being driven by other program changes that may have impacted
all students. In this analysis, I restrict the sample to only non-merit students and
examine if statistically significant changes on achievement outcomes occur for these
students after the introduction of the scholarship enhancement program. If other
program changes occurred around the time that the scholarship enhancement program
was introduced, significant effects on the achievement outcomes of non-merit students
might be observed. The results of Table 3.10 do not provide strong evidence for
this possibility. Estimated coefficients are mostly statistically insignificant. Even if
such program changes existed, the triple-difference design ensures that other program
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effects are isolated from the effect of the scholarship enhancement program. Further,
I replicate the analysis for the main results by randomly assigning majors as either
STEM or non-STEM. In a separate placebo analysis, I randomly assign students as
having a merit award or not. These exercises are repeated 1,000 times each and the
cumulative distribution of the 1,000 placebo estimates is displayed in Figures 3.3 and
3.4 for the STEM and merit recipient placebo exercises, respectively. The vertical
lines in each plot correspond to the actual coefficients reported in the main results.
Across the c.d.f plots, actual coefficients tend to be uniquely more positive than the
placebo estimates for low-income students. These results provide evidence that there
is something unique about the actual scholarship recipients and STEM fields that
contribute to the magnitude of the estimated effects in the main results.
3.5.2 Probing the Mechanism of the Differential Achievement
Effects of Grant Aid by Income by Examining Work-Study
Dollars Earned
Aside from examining if, and which, students benefit from grant aid, I also provide
suggestive evidence for a possible mechanism that would explain the heterogeneous
effects by income on achievement: time spent working.17 Before proceeding to
that analysis, I analyze if a one-to-one crowding-out effect occurs following the
additional aid—is there an equal reduction in other non-work-related aid sources when
a student receives the scholarship enhancement? Particularly, if the additional aid
were completely offset by any non-work-related aid sources, then I would not expect
a change in student work behavior. Panel A of Table 3.12 shows the results of this
17 I also consider changes in course loads as a possible mechanism for the heterogeneous effects by
income on achievement. The positive effect of grant aid on the GPAs of low-income students might
be driven by these students reducing their course load. To examine this possibility, I estimate the
effects of grant aid on course hours carried. Table 3.11 displays the preferred results of that analysis.
The results in Table 3.11 demonstrate that the increase in the GPAs of low-income students is not a
result of these students reducing their course load.
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analysis. Based on columns (1) through (4), there does not appear to be a one-to-one
crowding out effect of the additional aid, although students of both types do respond
to the additional aid by reducing their total loan amount (column 1).18
Panel B of Table 3.12 displays the estimated effects of grant aid on work-related
aid sources. Column (5) examines, among students with work-study, whether or
not the effect of additional aid on work-study dollars earned is significantly different
between low- and high-income students. The results demonstrate that the additional
aid decreased work-study dollars earned for low-income students only, despite the fact
that high-income students also participate in The Federal Work-Study Program (Scott-
Clayton 2017). The results suggest that low-income students may have decreased
their time spent working. I describe these results as suggestive evidence that grant
aid differentially effects work behavior for low- and high-income students since (1) I
do not observe the working behavior of students who work off-campus, who make up
the majority of students working while in college (Broton, Goldrick-Rab, and Benson
2016) and (2) I do not directly observe hours worked. Nevertheless, the results on
work-study dollars earned, coupled with the results on achievement, help to validate
the argument that low-income students are financially constrained and, as a result,
are more likely to change their work behavior following the receipt of grant aid than
high-income students.
3.6 Conclusion
Given the importance of a four-year degree, the college-completion gap between
low- and high-income students helps to perpetuate the financial and health disparities
observed among low- and high-income persons in our society. With the cost of college
rising, many students are facing difficulties financing their education. Among them,
18 The per-term reduction in total non-work-related aid is not equal to the $1,250 additional aid
amount received in a given term.
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low-income students face the most difficulties. These students are more likely to
work while in school . This is concerning because studies have shown that working
while in school harms students academically. States have stepped in to offer financial
assistance to students going to college, with many of them shifting their focus away
from need-based aid and towards merit-based aid. This shift has led to a compositional
change in grant aid recipients, as high-income students began receiving new grant aid
dollars, and also led to a national debate about which students should receive grant
aid.
I examine if grant aid impacts achievement and whether or not low-income students
are impacted most. I find that, for low-income merit-aid recipients, grant aid in a
given year increases their likelihood of graduating by 10.7 percentage points and
increases their GPA by 0.169 GPA points, on average. Further, the additional aid
led to reductions in work-study dollars earned for low-income students, suggesting
they may be responding to the additional aid by reducing their time spent working.
Grant aid does not impact achievement outcomes for high-income students, even when
considering time-to-degree.19
Policymakers should ensure that grant aid dollars are allocated efficiently—meaning
students with the most to gain should receive disproportionately more than students
with the least to gain. Given that grant aid mostly impacts, among merit-aid
recipients, low-income students, policymakers should consider means-tested merit
programs. Re-allocating more grant aid to these high-achieving, low-income students
would help to close the college-completion gap between low- and high-income students.
This policy recommendation is based on the assumption that policymakers perceive
19 Although the results of my paper demonstrate that grant aid does not impact the GPAs or
graduation prospects of high-income students, this paper does not conclude that these students aren’t
potentially impacted in other ways. For example, perhaps there are qualitative outcomes whereby
grant aid impacts high-income students (i.e., graduating with honors). The extent to which such
outcomes are important to policymakers should determine the degree to which the conclusions of
this paper are used to guide policy decisions.
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college completion as the primary motivation behind disbursing such funds.20 Even if
policymakers are primarily concerned about reducing the time-to-degree for students
who would graduate without states’ financial assistance, the evidence suggest that
incorporating some need-based component within merit programs would be impactful.
20 Similarly, institutions of higher learning should also consider means-tested merit programs if
their objective function closely mirrors that of state policymakers.
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Table 3.1 Approved Programs for the Scholarship Enhancement
Biochemistry and Molecular Biology
Biological Sciences
Biomedical Engineering
Cardiovascular Technology
Chemical Engineering
Chemistry
Civil Engineering
Clinical Laboratory Science
Computational Science
Computer Engineering
Computer Information Systems
Computer Science
Electrical Engineering
Engineering Technology Management
Environmental Science
Exercise and Sport Science
Geology
Geophysics
Health Promotion
Industrial Mathematics
Industrial Process Engineering
Information Management and Systems
Information Science
Integrated Information Technology
Marine Science
Mathematics
Mathematics & Computer Science
Mechanical Engineering
Middle Level Education, Mathematics/Science
Nursing, BSN Completion(RN to BSN)
Nursing, BSN Generic (No RN)
Pharmaceutical Studies
Physics
Public Health
Secondary Teacher Education, Biology
Secondary Teacher Education, Chemistry
Secondary Teacher Education, Comprehensive Science
Secondary Teacher Education, Mathematics
Statistics
Source: South Carolina Commission on Higher Education.
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics for Sample
Mean Standard Deviation
Female 0.62 0.49
Black 0.20 0.40
Hispanic 0.02 0.14
Age 20.94 1.60
SAT Score 1114.58 155.59
Sophomore 0.30 0.46
Junior 0.31 0.46
Senior 0.40 0.49
Low Income (EFC = 0) 0.47 0.50
Post 0.67 0.47
STEM 0.33 0.47
Merit 0.56 0.50
Post × STEM × Merit 0.13 0.34
Observations 28,343
Number of Unique Students 4,263
Note: For summary statistics, data is at the student-term level.
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Table 3.3 Effects of Grant Aid on GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No With Heterogeneity + Heterogeneity
Controls Controls by Income by Skill Control
Post × STEM × Merit 0.052 0.037 -0.050 -0.038
(0.050) (0.041) (0.057) (0.068)
Post × STEM × Merit × Low Income 0.192** 0.207**
(0.079) (0.080)
Post × STEM × Merit × SAT Score < Median 0.052
(0.082)
Term No Yes Yes Yes
Level No Yes Yes Yes
Term × Level No Yes Yes Yes
Student Major No Yes Yes Yes
Campus Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Effect for Low-Income Students 0.142** 0.169**
P-Value 0.012 0.033
R-Squared 0.007 0.052 0.053 0.053
Observations 28,343 28,343 28,343 28,234
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the student level.
OLS estimates.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The models include student fixed effects.
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Table 3.4 Effects of Grant Aid on the Likelihood of Graduating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No With Heterogeneity + Heterogeneity
Controls Controls by Income by Skill Control
Post × STEM × Merit 0.011 0.014 -0.008 0.022
(0.021) (0.016) (0.022) (0.040)
Post × STEM × Merit × Low Income 0.068** 0.085**
(0.022) (0.022)
Post × STEM × Merit × SAT Score < Median 0.057
(0.028)
School Year Entered No Yes Yes Yes
Student Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Campus Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Effect for Low-Income Students 0.060** 0.107*
P-Value 0.037 0.085
R-Squared 0.010 0.132 0.133 0.134
Observations 4,263 4,250 4,250 4,250
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust.
OLS estimates.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.5 Effects of Grant Aid on the Likelihood of Graduating Within Six Years -
Conditional on Graduating
Preferred
Post × STEM × Merit 0.002
(0.011)
Post × STEM × Merit × Low Income 0.050**
(0.016)
Post × STEM × Merit × SAT Score < Median -0.016***
(0.002)
Effect for Low-Income Students 0.053***
P-Value 0.005
R-Squared 0.178
Observations 4,044
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust.
OLS estimates.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The model includes campus fixed effects, fixed effects for
the school year the student entered college, and student controls.
The results shown are derived from a linear probability model.
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Table 3.6 Effects of Grant Aid on the ‘On-track to Graduate’ Measure
Preferred
Post × STEM × Merit 0.025
(0.036)
Post × STEM × Merit × Low Income 0.117***
(0.041)
Post × STEM × Merit × SAT Score < Median 0.004
(0.042)
Effect for Low Income Students 0.142***
P-Value 0.000
R-Squared 0.514
Observations 28,031
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the student level.
OLS estimates.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The model includes campus fixed effects, student fixed
effects, student major, and the full interaction of term with stu-
dent classification fixed effects. The results shown are derived
from a linear probability model.
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Table 3.7 Effects of Grant Aid on Achievement Outcomes - No Sample Restrictions
(1) (2)
GPA Graduation
Post × STEM × Merit -0.142*** -0.011
(0.050) (0.009)
Post × STEM × Merit × Low Income 0.098* 0.027**
(0.052) (0.008)
Post × STEM × Merit × SAT Score < Median 0.078 -0.001
(0.053) (0.019)
Effect for Low Income Students -0.044 0.015
P-Value 0.310 0.266
R-Squared 0.047 0.182
Observations 72,233 11,784
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust.
OLS estimates.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: For column (1), the model includes campus fixed effects, student
fixed effects, student major, and the full interaction of term with student
classification fixed effects. For column (2), the model includes campus fixed
effects, fixed effects for the school year the student entered college, and
student controls. The graduation results shown are derived from a linear
probability model.
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Table 3.8 Effects of Grant Aid on Achievement Outcomes - Testing for the Incentive Effect
Panel A: GPA Panel B: Graduation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low GPA High GPA Low GPA High GPA
Post × STEM × Merit -0.019 -0.098* -0.152** 0.018***
(0.145) (0.054) (0.049) (0.003)
Post × STEM × Merit × Low Income 0.313** 0.152** 0.185** 0.012**
(0.148) (0.063) (0.047) (0.004)
Post × STEM × Merit × SAT Score < Median -0.043 -0.008 0.187*** 0.034**
(0.159) (0.086) (0.013) (0.008)
Effect for Low Income Students 0.295 0.054 0.032 0.031***
P-Value 0.105 0.201 0.573 0.000
R-Squared 0.074 0.041 0.186 0.166
Observations 14,099 14,135 1,909 2,341
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust.
OLS estimates.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: For columns (1) and (2), the models include campus fixed effects, student fixed effects, student
major, and the full interaction of term with student classification fixed effects. For columns (3) and
(4), the models include campus fixed effects, fixed effects for the school year the student entered
college, and student controls. The graduation results shown are derived from a linear probability
model.
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Table 3.9 Effects of Grant Aid on Achievement Outcomes - Using Alternative
Income Groups
(1) (2)
GPA Graduation
Post × STEM × Merit -0.098 0.046
(0.108) (0.049)
Post × STEM × Merit × Always Pell Eligible & Always Zero EFC 0.213** 0.002
(0.094) (0.031)
Post × STEM × Merit × Always Pell Eligible & Not Always Zero EFC -0.005 -0.145*
(0.122) (0.055)
Post × STEM × Merit × Sometimes Pell Eligible 0.013 -0.073
(0.104) (0.043)
Post × STEM × Merit × SAT Score < Median 0.053 0.063
(0.082) (0.031)
Effect for Always-Pell-Eligible Students with Zero EFC 0.115 0.048*
P-Value 0.107 0.085
Effect for Always-Pell-Eligible Students without Zero EFC -0.104 -0.099***
P-Value 0.383 0.002
Effect for Sometimes-Pell-Eligible Students -0.086 -0.028
P-Value 0.258 0.119
R-Squared 0.054 0.139
Observations 28,234 4,250
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust.
OLS estimates.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: For column (1), the model includes campus fixed effects, student fixed effects, student major,
and the full interaction of term with student classification fixed effects. For column (2), the model
includes campus fixed effects, fixed effects for the school year the student entered college, and
student controls. The graduation results shown are derived from a linear probability model.
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Table 3.10 Falsification Tests
Non-Merit
(1) (2)
GPA Graduation
Post × Stem 0.038 -0.017
(0.087) (0.012)
Post × Stem × Low Income -0.064 0.006
(0.094) (0.009)
Post × Stem × SAT Score < Median -0.200* -0.032
(0.114) (0.034)
Effect for Low Income Students -0.026 -0.011
P-Value 0.579 0.151
R-Squared 0.049 0.343
Observations 6,982 1,048
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust.
OLS estimates.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: For column (1), the model includes campus fixed effects,
student fixed effects, student major, and the full interaction of
term with student classification fixed effects. For column (2), the
model includes campus fixed effects, fixed effects for the school
year the student entered college, and student controls. The
graduation results shown are derived from a linear probability
model.
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Table 3.11 Effects of Grant Aid on Course Hours Carried
Preferred
Post × STEM × Merit 0.348
(0.298)
Post × STEM × Merit × Low Income -0.341
(0.348)
Post × STEM × Merit × SAT Score < Median 0.300
(0.343)
Effect for Low Income Students 0.007
P-Value 0.980
R-Squared 0.499
Observations 28,234
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the student level.
OLS estimates.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The model includes campus fixed effects, student fixed
effects, student major, and the full interaction of term with
student classification fixed effects.
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Table 3.12 Effects of Grant Aid on Other Aid Sources
Panel A: Non-Work-Related Aid Sources Panel B: Work-Related Aid Sources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loans Other Grants Total Work-Study Student HasScholarships Dollars Earned if > 0 Work-Study?
Post × STEM × Merit -696.649*** -104.724 -22.013 -823.385*** -66.331 0.014
(186.383) (69.419) (82.195) (196.614) (281.533) (0.022)
Post × STEM × Merit × Low Income 304.611 208.472 53.354 566.437* -801.924* -0.025
(251.400) (155.226) (112.840) (294.054) (470.751) (0.028)
Effect for Low Income Students -392.038** 103.748 31.341 -256.949 -868.255** -0.011
P-Value 0.026 0.472 0.694 0.267 0.022 0.569
R-Squared 0.214 0.061 0.202 0.268 0.252 0.023
Observations 28,343 28,343 28,343 28,343 1,214 28,343
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the student level.
OLS estimates.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: The models include campus fixed effects, student fixed effects, student major, and the full interaction of term with student
classification fixed effects. Column (6) shows the results of a linear probability model.
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Figure 3.1 The Share of Total Undergraduate State Grant Aid That is Non-Need
Based by Year
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Figure 3.2 Total Grant Aid for Undergraduate Students in 2017 Dollars (in Millions)
by School Year
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Figure 3.3 Cumulative Distribution of 1,000 Replication Estimates of the Effect of
Grant Aid on Achievement, by Income Group - Randomly Assigning Majors as STEM
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